On the grammar of names

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the relatively neglected morphosyntax of names, which has not aroused the kind of interest and controversy associated with the (putative) semantics of names. It also focuses on a few Indo-European languages (French, Greek and particularly English), and thus does not seek to be exhaustive in its account of the variations in name syntax and morphology; but significant variation is nevertheless encountered, and analysed. §1 offers some informal observations on semantic and syntactic properties of names and the extent to which these are shared with other categories. Gross similarities with personal pronouns and other definites, but particularly deictics, can be observed (§1.1). Crucial characterising properties (positive and negative), such as definiteness, partitivity, specificity and what I call primary identification, are further discussed in §1.2. Similarities between names and generic (particularly abstract) uncountables are also noted, in §1.4, following some general discussion of generics in §1.3. §1.1 is concerned too with establishing a distinction between the vocative use of names, where they are not definite, and their use as arguments. And §1 also begins to distinguish between different semantic subclasses of names, but this is more properly the task of §2.1, where different kinds of personal and place names are differentiated and their more salient morphosyntactic characteristics commented upon. This is followed in §2.2 by a consideration both of the historic sources of names and of some of the properties and functions of systems of naming; and here is noted the typical de-semanticisation of names compared with the common words that are their typical historical source. In §3.1 is outlined the notionally-based system of syntactic categories suggested in Anderson (1997) and the place in it of names, which are classed with pronouns/determiners; and in §3.2 these various subclasses are differentiated in their categorial representations, particularly in the light of the observations made in §1. §3.2.1 discusses the deictic component of demonstratives, which enables primary identification of an argument. The following subsections in §3.2 are concerned with the syntax of the other providers of primary identification, names, including in their vocative use, in their role in nominations and in their definite use as arguments. But the antepenultimate subsection in §3.2 returns to the representation of indefinites and especially generics, before §3.2.6 finally offers a categorial representation for names. §3.3 is concerned with the major kinds of (lexical) derivational processes that can form names and with the role of names in derivational processes forming other names or items of other categories, and the light these throw on the semantics of names and naming.
What follows is concerned with the grammar of names, primarily with their syntax but also with the formation of names.* I hypothesise (despite e.g. Hacking 1968) that in all languages names have a syntax distinctive from other syntactic categories. The extent to which there are overt markers of namehood varies from language to language, so that formal definitions of names, or ‘proper nouns’, based on, for example, the resistance in English of core members of the class to pluralisation or accompaniment by a determiner (despite being ‘definite’ – cf. Bloomfield 1933: 205), or the initial-capitalisation given to names in writing, are obviously hopelessly parochial. But I shall try to show in what follows that it is plausible to suggest that there is as a property of all languages a notionally coherent class of items with an associated basic syntax and morphology that corresponds to the least controversial traditional idea of what a name is.

Of course, there has been considerable equivocation, or at least ambivalence and inexplicitness, over the use of ‘name’, even in the linguistic literature. And the general confusion in usage is well illustrated by the first two definitions provided by the OED:

1. The particular combination of sounds employed as the individual designation of a single person, animal, place, or thing. …
2. The particular word or words used to denote any object of thought not considered in, or not possessed of, a purely individual character.

In relation to the latter, there is cited, among other things: The offence, by whatever name called, which if committed in England would be perjury. Consider too the COD:

1. Word by which individual person, animal, place, or thing, is spoken of or to …
2. Word denoting any object of thought, esp. one applicable to many individuals …

And consider too the difference between the common understandings of ‘dog name’ vs. ‘bird name’: a ‘dog name’ for many English speakers would be *Bonzo* or *Rover*, for example; but a ‘bird name’, on the most obvious interpretation, is not *Polly* or *Chirpie* but *willow warbler* or *snipe*: *Bonzo* and *Chirpie* are ‘proper names’, *snipe* is a ‘common noun’ which is a lowest level hyponym. There is an ontogenetic connexion between the two kinds of naming involved (cf. e.g. Anderson 2000). However I am concerned here with the status in the (adult) grammar of items like *Bonzo* and *Polly* but not with those like *snipe*, except in so far as this last indeed instantiates a grammatical non-name, viz. a common noun. In English the verb *name* (*I name this child Hieronymus*) is generally used with names proper, whereas *call* is used more generally (*I call that handsome*).

However, outside what I shall identify as core instances of names there are undoubtedly name-like items which are closer to common nouns, semantically and syntactically. We take up such questions of classification in §2, along with a brief consideration of the internal structure of names. In the section which immediately follows now, I focus on the semantic and syntactic character of core names in a selection of languages, in particular those applied to persons, though even there, in the course of an attempt to identify the properties of core names, the discussion will lead us to some more peripheral examples of the name category, and of name-like noun types. The discussion therein remains rather informal. In §3 I offer a more precise formulation of the representation and morphosyntax of names as a universal category.

Detailed discussion throughout focuses on a very small number of familiar Indo-European languages. Inevitably, this means that some variables in the character of names and naming are neglected, though I do not think that the account given of their general properties suffer thereby. But the aim of this restricted focus is not merely to render discussion and description more manageable, but also to illustrate how much variation in the morphosyntactic structure of names and related elements is to be found even among these genetically related languages. This recognition of fundamental variability seems to me to open up a more revealing research strategy than one driven by an obsession with finding, no matter what, instantiations of ‘universal grammar’. Such variations in ‘expression’ can be as significant for our understanding of human cognitive abilities as the universal properties which they manipulate, whether one views these latter as specific to language or not.
1 Some observations concerning the functions of names and other referentials
Traditionally, and reflecting something of the usage just exemplified, grammarians have drawn a
categorial distinction between two kinds of ‘name’, or ‘noun’, typically along the lines of the following
(from the eighteenth-century translation of the Port Royal Grammar, which talks in terms, and with
examples, one can trace back to the grammarians of Ancient Greece):

There are two sorts of ideas, one which represents to us only one thing: as the idea, which
each person has of his father and mother, of his friend, of his horse, his dog, of himself, &c.
The other which represents to us several similar things, to which this idea equally agrees, as the
idea I have of a man in general, of a horse in general, &c.

Men have occasion for different names to express these two different sorts of ideas.

They have given the appellation of proper names, to those, which agree to a single idea, as the
name of Socrates, which agrees to a certain philosopher; the name of Paris, which agrees to a
particular city.

They have called general or appellative names, those, which signify common ideas; as the
word man, which agrees to all men in general; and in like manner the words, lion, dog, horse,
&c.

(A General and Rational Grammar 1753: 29; cf. Wilkins 1668: 299). Despite the equivocation in
common usage, such a characterisation of the proper name/noun vs. general/appellative/common
name/noun distinction persists throughout the grammatical tradition, in grammars with diverse aims
and audiences. Consider, from somewhat later:

Proper names or substantives, are the names appropriated to individuals; as, George,
London, Thames.

Common names or substantives, stand for kinds containing many sorts, or for sorts
containing many individuals under them; as, animal, man, tree, &c. (Murray 1829: 17-8)

Or:

Names are either Proper or Common. Proper names are appropriated to certain individual
objects. Common names are applied to a whole class of objects. George, Mary, London,
&c., designate one particular person or place. Man, father, town, horse, &c., represent objects
of which there is a class or collection. (Latham 1862: §633)

Despite this apparently clearcut notional distinction and the manifest syntactic differences
between (clear instances of) what I shall refer to as (proper) names and (common) nouns, it is typically
the case that little attention is paid in grammars of particular languages to the distinctiveness of names
(and they may not figure at all in the index to the grammar), unless some morphosyntactic stigma of
namehood is sufficiently gross to demand attention. Thus grammars of Hungarian are compelled to
attend to the suffix -nak/-nek which attaches to names which, on the usual interpretation, complement
verbs of nomination, as in (1.a) – though, to be sure, it also attaches to non-name complements of such
verbs, as in (1.b):

(1) a. Én Ferinek fogom hívni
I Frank I-shall call (him)
b. Ezt szépnek mondják
this beautiful they-call

And little attention is paid to the syntactic correlates of the notional subcategories of name provided by
some grammars, unless one is particularly salient, such as the co-occurrence of some subcategories of
name in English (such as river names) with the definite article, despite its general incompatibility with
names: cf. the Thames vs. e.g. the mountain name Scawfell. All too typical is what is explicitly
acknowledged by Fries: ‘In this book I have not dealt with proper names’ (1952: 120, fn. 4).

Likewise, with a few notable exceptions which I shall acknowledge as we proceed, little
theoretical attention in linguistics has been paid to the morphosyntax of names (as bemoaned by e.g.
Gary-Prieur 1994: 2-4), although there is an extensive philosophical literature on names and similar
expressions concerned with issues in semantics and pragmatics, as well as a number of such
discussions in the theoretical linguistic literature (see Sørensen (1963), Seppänen (1974), Lyons (1977:
§7.5, Conrad (1985) and Gary-Prieur (1994: part I) for brief reviews of earlier work. Indeed, treatises devoted to ‘the theory of names’ and the like, such as Pulgram (1954) and others noted by Nuessel (1992: 5), are typically concerned almost entirely with the semantic properties of names and with their origins. Some scholars (such as Kleiber 1981) have seen names as marginal even to the semantic structure of languages. And ‘onomastics’ is often construed as concerned only with the origins or etymologies of names (cf. e.g. the discussions in part IV of Robinson 1993). Thus, it remains unclear from such accounts precisely what is the character of the categorial – or other – distinction between names and nouns: is this a word class difference (contrary to what seems to be assumed, but almost never explicitly argued, by the tradition)? are other categories related, notionally and distributionally, more to one of the two categories than the other? … The problem posed by Kuryłłowicz (1966: 370) in summing up his discussion of names has been addressed only fitfully: ‘Les remarques précédentes ont le but de poser le problème grammatical du nom propre en le dégageant de la richesse déconcertante de points de vue et de considérations d’ordre non-linguistique, qui tendent à occuper le premier plan dans les recherches onomastiques’. What follows at least adds another point of view on the grammar of names!

I take as a starting point in what follows the appropriateness of something like the notional distinction between names and nouns drawn by the Port Royal Grammar, though I shall look in some more detail at the character of this and how it relates to other distinctions between putative categories. I assume also that such notional distinctions between names and nouns drawn at least by the core members of syntactic categories are what characterise them cross-linguistically and that they are basic to an understanding of the syntax of these categories. That is, I espouse here a traditional notionalist view of the basis of syntax. I do not defend this further at this point; rather, the interest or otherwise of what follows constitutes support or otherwise (but see for a more extensive discussion Anderson 1997). I also start out by focusing on the behaviour of the core members of the category of names mentioned by the Port Royal Grammar, those whose membership is least controversial and whose properties can be taken as typical, personal names and, to a much lesser extent in this section (for reasons that will become apparent in the next), place names. Let us begin by establishing two main linguistic functions fulfilled by names, a distinction anticipated in the first definition from the COD cited above.

1.1 Names, vocatives, deictics and primary identification  In the apparent absence of syntax, the primary function of names is vocative, attention seeking, as exemplified in (2.a):

(2) a. Basil!
   b. I read that, Basil

(cf. e.g. Lyons 1977: 217). And they can serve a vocative and/or phatic function as an ‘extrasentential’ element in utterances such as that in (2.b). Syntactically, when used as arguments, i.e. referential (potentially referring) terms, names otherwise constitute with deictics the primary means of establishing the identity of arguments in predications – of ensuring that both speaker and addressee know the identity of a particular argument:

(3) a. I don’t like Basil
   b. I don’t like that

I must and that can be interpreted deictically, as ‘linguistic elements whose interpretation in simple sentences makes essential reference to properties of the extralinguistic context of the utterance in which they occur’ (Anderson & Keenan 1985: 259). I adopt here the more explicit characterisation of deixis given by Lyons (1977: 637):

By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about to, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee.

Together with the name Basil (unless the speaker has misjudged the shared knowledge of the speech act participants), the deictics ensure that the likers and the likees in (3) (which numbering is now functioning for you and me as a name) are identified. Deictics and names share this identificatory capacity as arguments; names and one deictic (you) also together constitute the core set of vocatives. We shall find that the distinction between argument function and function as a vocative is an important one for our understanding of the character of names.
In what immediately follows I shall be looking, rather informally at this point, at various semantic and morphosyntactic properties that both distinguish and relate the category of names from and to other putative categories. I defer for the moment the questions of whether the category of names constitutes a word class distinct from nouns, whether it belongs to some other more inclusive class, or whether it is indeed a subcategory of noun. The term ‘category’ is meant here to be neutral in this respect: use of it merely claims that the set of names is distinctive notionally and distributionally. I want now to look at the characteristics of the category in different languages and how closely it is related to other distinguishable categories, and, in the next section, whether and how it itself subcategorises. As indicated, my starting point is the assumption underlying ‘notional grammar’ (particularly as embodied in Anderson 1997) that basic syntactic distribution and morphological differentiation reflect the semantic character of the categories invoked by the syntax. In the case of the elements discussed in the previous paragraph, names and deictics, the similarities in their distribution – such as the resistance of both names and deictics to modification, their shared use as typical vocatives – is a consequence of the shared semantico-pragmatic property of in a particular context uniquely identifying, without recourse to description, a particular argument.

Other successful identifications of arguments than by name or deixis depend ultimately on such elements, as in, say, (4):

(4)  a. You remember the girl who doesn’t like Basil? She just sat down over there  
     b. Don’t you like the statue? It is unusual, I agree

In the first sentence in (4.a) a description is offered as identificatory, on the basis of shared knowledge including crucially the identity of Basil, and by using the definite (but not deictic) the, the speaker is signalling that, in this linguistic context, s/he intends and hopes that the identification will be successful. In the second sentence of (4.a) use of the definite she depends on the immediately preceding linguistic context. In (4.b), taken as sequel to (3.b), the definites the and it rely on this linguistic context, including crucially the deictic that, to make identifications. We have in these instances derived identification. Of course, these little examples greatly simplify the chain of connexions whereby derived identifications may be established. But as arguments, deictics and names have something extra that does not limit their identificatory capacity to such a dependence on (other) identifiers or the linguistic context: they enable primary identification. Any account of the grammar of names must take account of this ‘something extra’, as well as the identificatorily weaker property of definiteness which they share with, for instance, the and she, representatives of the set of (non-deictic) definite determiners and personal pronouns.

Unlike deictics, names are not dependent on the immediate non-linguistic context. But, of course, again unlike with deictics, the use of a name like Basil for identification presupposes that the speaker and addressee have participated, together or separately, in a naming to them, as Basil, of the same entity, and that, if separate namings are involved, they have ascertained that their namings correspond. An act of didactic nomination (Lyons 1977: 217-8), or an assurance of correspondence, may involve (more or less polite) ostension (deixis), or description, as in (5):

(5)  a. This is Basil  
     b. Basil is him  
     c. Basil is that guy over there  
     d. Basil is the one who married Clotilde

Vocative use of a name by a speaker is, trivially, similarly dependent on prior nomination. Carroll (1985: ch.8, §3.1) examines the character of nominations, or ‘baptisms’, and emphasises that such an act may depend on a ‘reference-fixing description’.

Literary flouting of (our expectations concerning) the rites of nomination is illustrated by the treatment of a character in Aldous Huxley’s Point Counter Point. ‘Norah’ is introduced in ch.4 in the following way:

‘Wasn’t the Old Man too marvellously funny?’ Polly Logan had found a friend.  
‘And the little carrotty man with him.’  
‘Like Mutt and Jeff.’  
‘I thought I should die of laughing,’ said Norah.

The conversation continues, and attracts other characters, and Norah disappears from it. She reappears only twice in the book: later in the same chapter we learn, after a brief resumption of conversation
between Polly and Norah, that ‘Norah was also under twenty’; and there is a brief allusion to her, towards the end of ch.11, in some quoted thoughts of Polly’s, viz. ‘And then think of wasting attempted cleverness on Norah! Norah! Oh Lord, oh Lord.’ The reader has still not been ‘properly introduced’ – and never is.

The sentences in (5) are equative, and in each case Basil is a definite argument, whether pre- or post-verbal. The complements of is here are not predicative, and thus if the discourse circumstances are appropriate they may be interchanged with their subjects, as one expects with equatives: e.g. That guy over there is Basil. Thus, I am Basil is a suitable answer to the question Who are you?, which asks for identification of an argument, but not to the question What are you?, which seeks for the specification of a predicator.

In Greek, as elsewhere when names are arguments, the name in such sentences as are illustrated by (5) is normally accompanied by the definite article, as exemplified by (6.a):

(6) a. Aftos ine o Vasilis
this is (the) Basil
b. Dhen idha to Vasilis
not I-saw (the) Basil

Compare the name in ‘object’ function in (6.b), again with preceding article. Likewise, names in Hidatsa are typically accompanied by the s that otherwise is a realisation of definite article/demonstrative (Matthews 1965: §5.1 – though he appears to regard this as coincidental: see p.174). So too, e.g. in Mezquital Otomi, personal names are accompanied either by the article ra (ra šíwa ’the John’ – cf. ra zi nga’i ’the little house’) or a title (nda pedro ’Mr. Peter’) or both (ra nda lüpe ’the Mr. Philip’) – examples adapted from Hess 1968: ch.3, §5.

However, in acts of performative nomination (cf. again Lyons 1977: 217-8), and in sentences containing verbs of naming (which can be used performatively), definiteness of the name, identification, is not assumed; rather identity is assigned. In the English sentences in (7.a-b), whether performative or not, Basil is not definite, and it is predicative, in a sense to which we shall return:

(7) a. I name this child Basil
That one/Their youngest child is called Basil
c. Onomazete Vasilis/Ton lene Vasili
he-is-called Basil/Him they-call Basil
d. Vassili!

Unsurprisingly, the name in the nominating Greek sentence in (7.c) lacks the definite article; and the article is also absent in Greek in vocative use of names, illustrated by (7.d). (See too e.g. Krámský 1972: 169, on Albanian.)

Some languages have a specialised article for names. Thus Krupa (1982: 112) observes: “A feature common to Polynesian languages is the presence of an article for proper names” (cf. too Matthews 1926). The name article may not occur in all positions; typically it is restricted to names functioning as subjects and names governed by certain prepositions. Its occurrence is exemplified in (8.a), from Maori (Biggs 1969: 30):

(8) a. Ka hariruu a Mere ki a Rongo
aspect shake-hands art Mary with art Rongo
(‘Mary shakes hands with Rongo’)
b. To oku ijoa ko Vero
My name focus Vero
(‘My name is Vero’)

(See too, more generally on ‘personal’ and ‘respectful’ articles, Krámský 1972: 101-9.) But, as in Greek, the Polynesian article is not used with a name which is part of an act of nomination, as illustrated by (8.b), from Rapanui (du Feu 1996: 61; cf. Bauer 1993: 274, on Maori).

Let us now look a little more closely at vocatives, in the light of (7.d). Apart from deictics (you), vocatives other than names are patently not definite in English, as with Look here, mate! or, even more obviously, Whoever said that, come out here (Quirk & Greenbaum 1973: §7.32). Names, I am suggesting, conform to this pattern: as vocatives they are not definite. And it is indeed consistent to suggest that even vocative you, though deictic, is not definite: identification is not assumed but established deictically in such utterances as Come here, you. Names also share a pervasive vocative,
and non-definite use with nouns of family relationship (Mother, Dad) and social and professional status or function or sometimes title (Waiter, Chairman, Doctor, Madame).

Nouns of relationship and some professional terms (e.g. Nurse) can indeed be used as names, as the basis for primary identification and with the syntactic restrictions associated with names; that is, we have names derived from such common words. **Kinship** names are also typically deictic: they are the kind of amalgam of name and deictic term that is discussed towards the end of §2.1 in relation to calendrical terms like Tomorrow. A relationship between kinship terms (and some professional ones) and names is rather pervasive, and may even be reflected in the morphology. Thus, in Basque, for instance, nouns of superior-to-inferior family relationship (e.g. aitaso ‘grandfather’, ocho ‘uncle’) and the word for ‘(local) king’ decline in the same way as names.

Vocatives in general serve to identify the addressee, or, particularly if the addressee is obvious, ‘to indicate the speaker’ s attitude to, or view of, some aspect of the addressee(s), such as status, role or personality’ (Davies 1986: 144). By extension, the someone of Close the door, someone or The phone’s ringing, someone is ‘used not to identify a specific individual to whom the utterance is addressed, as most vocatives are … but rather to indicate that the speaker is indifferent as to which of his hearers assumes the role of addressee’ (Davies 1986: 21). Vocatives reveal that naming and deixis are independent of definiteness, though in arguments they are (except in utterances of nomination) combined with it.

This notional distinction, involving definite vs. non-definite use of names, reflected in the morphosyntax of Greek and elsewhere, is also important for a characterisation of the grammar of names. It is not sufficient to dismiss it after the fashion of the Port Royal Grammar:

> We see by this that the article ought not to be joined to proper names; because as these signify a single and determined thing, they have no occasion for the determination of the article.

> And yet as custom and reason often differ, the article is sometimes used in Greek, even with the proper names of men, as ο Φίλιππος.

*(A General and Rational Grammar 1753: 52)*. Further, such phenomena underline the parochialism (whatever its other virtues and vices) of attempted definitions like Vendler’s (1967: 42): ‘A proper noun … is a noun which has no specific co-occurrence restrictions and which precludes restrictive adjuncts and, consequently, articles of any kind in the same phrase’.

The traditional criteria for names – initial capitalisation, absence of a plural, rejection of the article (cf. again Bloomfield 1933: 205; also Algeo 1973) – are indeed, as noted initially, all parochial (and cf. e.g. Gómez de Silva 1994: 205-6). (And recall that Bloomfield also requires that names be ‘always definite’ – which, as we’ve seen, is not the case.) As Mithun (1984: 40-1) observes, none of these is applicable to a language like Mohawk, in which most nouns are not marked for plural and which lacks a category of articles. And she goes on to observe that there does exist a ‘particle’ that ‘can be interpreted as implying definiteness’, but it co-occurs with both personal names and common nouns. It is clear that these crude criteria are not as such essential to the characterisation of names. Their prevalence in definitions is, however, indicative of a contingent status therein.

Rather obviously, as we have observed, use of a name presupposes prior nomination. It is obvious too that few names assigned by nomination are indeed unique, and they are generally drawn from a common stock; but in context a name can enable primary identification, identification not derivative of the linguistic context. As expressed by the Port Royal Grammar (1753: 30): ‘Not but that the proper name frequently agrees with many, as Peter, John, &c. But this is only by accident, by reason that several have taken the same name.’ Creative writers can of course play with this assumption of uniqueness: Thackeray, for instance, gives his hero in Pendennis the same (personal and family) name as his (the hero’s) uncle, also prominent in the novel; and differentiation depends on context and the judicious deployment of title and hypocorism. A linguistic representation of names should, however, reflect their identificatory capacity, whatever its basis, whatever their wider-context-dependence, just as linguistic description should embody a recognition of deixis as something which can also establish primary identification in an immediate context. Names and deictics share with the other definites in (3) the conveying of the speaker’s assumption that the addressee can also identify the particular entity or entities referred to by an argument. But, as I’m suggesting, they have additional components that enable primary identification, and names and you share a function as core vocatives, thus as non-definites.

### 1.2 Definiteness, specificity and partitivity

As has long been recognised, simple definites, including ‘third person’ pronouns, can function like the primary identifiers if the descriptions (though minimal in
the case of pronouns) they are associated with uniquely identify some entity or entities in the relevant
text as in (9.a) and (b):

(9)  a. I prefer the pink ones (said by e.g. person choosing floor tiles)
    b. Will you feed the dog? (said by e.g. wife to husband, the joint owner of Bonzo)
    c. The government/Government has decided
    d. The President has left
    e. Government has decided

The use of the dog in (9.b) (from Vendler 1967: §2.12) approximates indeed to the use of a name.
This is even more apparent in an example like (9.c). But, unlike a name, the dog and the government
do not always function as a primary identifier, and such a use has severe contextual limitations.

Similarly, according to Sørensen (1958: 175), despite initial-capitalisation, and the
disfavouring of attribution, the ‘title’ in (9.d) is not a name, though he does not clarify at this point how
such ‘titles’ fail his definition. Certainly, there is also a (uncapitalised) common noun use, and even
when capitalised the article is retained. But the context in which it may enable primary identification is
considerably wider than that associated with (9.a-b): it is institutionalised; in linguistic terms, it is
arguably lexicalised as a name. Presence with such items of attributives is limited – to temporals like
that in the late President, though such a possibility can in itself be taken to be an indication of non-core
status as a name. However, do we see in the variable (in my experience) capitalisation in (9.c) the
beginning of institutionalisation of a name? I return to such cases in the next section, where we
encounter some explicit arguments of Sørensen’s concerning (what seem to me to be) analogous place
names.

However that may be, in (9.e) the nominal item of (9.c) seems clearly to have made the
transition to name status, in so far as in English singular count nouns, but not names, are normally
accompanied by a determiner and permit attributives. In Astute government is what is needed, with
attributive, on the other hand, what is involved is a mass term, not name. Now, as this example
reminds us, mass nouns (and plurals) may also lack a determiner; but the subject of (9.e), in the sense
assumed here, as equivalent to the subject of (9.e), is resistant not just to attributivisation but
specifically to the quantification (little, much etc.) associated with mass terms (mud, air, government
etc.). Government is a name in (9.e). We shall nevertheless return to the similarities between names
and mass nouns, for the sake of whatever light they may shed on the character of names. Here we
have established in (9.e) a subtype of personal name, the collective personal name, derived from an
institutional collective noun, which as such functions as a primary identifier.

With simple (non-deictic) definites, on the other hand, identification may be incomplete; the
identification they provide may not be deictic/primary, as in (9.a-d), or may not even derive from a
primary identification, as in (4), but be purely descriptive, as with one interpretation of Donnellan’s
(1966) example replicated in (10.a), or as with (10.b):

(10) a. Smith’s murderer is insane
    b. The author of this pamphlet is a liar

On these interpretations – Donnellan’s ‘attributive’ (vs. ‘referential’) – reference is to whatever
otherwise- unidentified person respectively murdered Smith or wrote the pamphlet; and this can be
spelled out as ...whoever s/he may be. I shall employ the label non-specific identification for this use
of definites, often discussed in terms of ‘referential opacity’ (Quine 1960). In the absence of
deixis/naming or derived identification, definites are non-specific; and this use is much more general
than is often acknowledged. Names and overt deixics, on the other hand, are not used non-
specifically. Names (and deixics, such as the narrator’s I) may be used for fictional entities, but the
identification remains specific. This is a further salient notional property of names.

Non-specific identification of a definite expression is typically the result of the entity
concerned having been introduced as an indefinite, as in the first sentence in (11.a) (and as might have
been the case with (10)):

(11)  a. A boy and a girl came to see Jill. The girl knows Jack
    b. There were a boy and a girl came to see Jill
    c. It was a boy and a girl came to see Jill

The specific identity of the girl is not established, but a boy and a girl nevertheless introduce specific
though not specifically identified entities. We have in the case of these indefinites what we might call
'specific non-identification': the speaker has a specific referent in mind, but does not, or cannot, identify it to the addressee. Existence is claimed for the referent of such indefinites, whereas it is assumed with definites, which, rather, in their case, make claims concerning identity. The existential status of a boy and a girl is made explicit in the periphrastic variant of the unmarked reading of the first sentence of (11.a) which is given as (11.b). (11.c) unpacks a contrastive reading for that sentence where existence (but not identity) is assumed.

But indefinites too can be non-specific, in so far as they are used in expressions for particular entities whose existence is not asserted or presupposed, as in the ‘habitual’ but ‘real’, and in the (much-discussed) modal or ‘unreal’, contexts of (12):

(12) a. I eat an orange at breakfast
    b. Bill longs for a yacht

There is for these no analogue to (11). For some speakers of Macedonian, according to Berent (1977), only specific, but not non-specific, indefinite objects permit ‘doubling’ by a pronominal ‘clitic’, as illustrated by (13.a) vs. (b):

(13) a. Sakam da go pluknam eden čovek koj be đe včera kaj tebe
  I-want that him I-spit-on one man who was yesterday at you
  (‘I want to spit at a man who was at your place yesterday’)

b. Sakam da (*go) pluknam eden čovek, no ne znam kogo
  I-want that (*him) I-spit-on one man, but not I-know who
  (‘I want to spit at a man, but I don’t know who’)

Whatever the merits of accounts of (12) and the like involving scope of quantification (cf. Lyons’ (1977: 190-1) critique of such analyses of the (12.b) type), the observations made here suggest that a parallel distinction of specificity is relevant to definites and indefinites: specific definites establish identity; specific indefinites establish existence.

I note also here that non-specific identification is, unsurprisingly, associated with definite expressions involving entities introduced as non-specific indefinites (as well as specific, as in (11)), as with the it in (14.a):

(14) a. Bill longs for a yacht, so that he can sail it to Cuba
    b. Bill has bought a yacht, so that he can sail it to Cuba

The identification associated with the first definite in the second clause in both (14.a) and (b) is specific, though derivative of the primary identification of one entity as Bill; and the other definite in both cases is non-specific, in referring back to an indefinite, and in the case of (14.a) a non-specific one, the indefinite in (14.b) being again specific.

If indefinites, as opposed to specific indefinites, do not necessarily introduce existentiality, what is their function? Definites are associated with the speaker’s and addressee’s identification, specific or not, of an entity. Indefinites may also be specific or not; the entities involved may or may not be claimed to exist. What are involved in both cases of indefinites are (specific or non-specific) members or subsets of the set of entities described by the associated noun phrase. This may be marked overtly, as with the use of quantifiers, and of the indefinite article with singular count nouns, as in (11)-(14), or it may be covert, as with the subjects of the sentences in (15.a) and (b), which are both specific indefinites, involving sub-sets/-parts, on the most salient interpretations:

(15) a. Men came towards me
    b. Water fell on me
    c. I’ll hire painters
    d. I want wine

This is likewise the case with the objects in (15c) and (d), where the interpretations are most obviously non-specific, but again involve a partitive relation. This property of partitivity illustrated in (15) is again something that should be reflected in the linguistic representation of appropriate referentials, as well as its absence in others.

Definiteness and indefiniteness and their combination with specificity contribute to different ‘degrees of determination’ of nouns: cf. de la Grasserie (1895), who ranges proper names at one end of such a scale and the predicative use of nouns at the other (and who also allows for a ‘latent article’).
1.3 Generics  ‘Generic utterances’ are a special case of utterances with arguments that are non-specific; they are minimally described (and thus minimally circumscribed) non-specifics. We can perhaps recognise a cline of genericness for utterances ranging from the ‘habitual’ of (12.a), in which one of the arguments (I) is not merely specific but identified, to classic types from English such as those in (16):

(16) a. A lion is a dangerous animal  
   b. Lions are dangerous animals  
   c. Sugar dissolves in water  

In (16.a) and (b) we have only a non-specific indefinite (subject) argument, singular and plural respectively, combined with a predicative expression whose tensing is non-specific; and in (16.c) we have two mass non-specific indefinites and non-specific tensing. Intermediate perhaps are such utterances as those in (17):

(17) a. At one time there were dodos  
   b. The author of this pamphlet writes well  

(17.a) has a non-specific indefinite whose existence is tensed (involves deixis), and thus shows decreased genericness. With the utterances in (16), on the other hand, all potential reference is non-specific. (17.b) contains a non-specific definite with non-specific tensing, but the subject argument introduces partitivity: the existence of a particular member of the set of authors is assumed; s/he is assumed to be identifiable. Full genericness demands non-specificity and non-partitivity. The suggested cline is, of course, a fuzzy one, particularly given the uncertainties in weighting the contributions of different varieties of specificity and instances of partitivity to the reduction of genericness.

We can thus characterise the generic argument in (16.b) as lacking partivity (in contrast with the similarly non-specific indefinite object of (15.b)), as well as non-specificity. Such non-partitive non-specific indefinites nevertheless allow a distributive as well as a collective interpretation, as illustrated by sentence (18.a) (vs. (b)):

(18) a. Lions have four legs and a tail  
   b. Lions are extinct  

In (18.a) the possession of four legs and a tail is attributed to individual members of the set of lions, whereas in (18.b) extinction is necessarily attributed to the set. The singular indefinite excludes, of course, the necessarily collective interpretation:

(19) a. A lion has four legs and a tail  
   b. *A lion is extinct  

Our representation of such arguments must reflect this association between distributiveness and singularity. But we must also allow for the compatibility of genericness with apparent singular partivity that is shown in (19.a), as well as with distributiveness – however these are to be characterised. Of these utterances it is apparently only (18.b) that combines non-specificity and non-partitivity. Is this the core generic type? At least for English?

These particular fully generic utterances in (16), (18) and (19) all involve indefinite non-specifics. But we also find in English, alongside (16 a-b), the utterance (20.a):

(20) a. The lion is a dangerous animal  
   b. The lions are dangerous animals  
   c. The sugar dissolves in the water  

We have a non-specific definite argument in this case, along with non-specific tensing, but again, as with (16) and (18), the utterance is, on one interpretation, fully generic, unlike (17.b). Unlike (16) and (18), (20.a) also has a non-generic interpretation. The argument in (20.a) is singular, but the behaviour of this singular definite differs from that of the singular indefinite illustrated in (19) (cf. Lyons 1977: 196): although, as with indefinite singulars, the definite singular is usually partitive (cf. Vendler 1967: §2.11), as in e.g. (17.b), an
argument marked with the (but not a(n)) can be accorded either a collective or a distributive interpretation if it is generic:

(21) a. The lion has four legs and a tail  
    b. The lion is extinct

Compare the examples in (8) and (11.a). Again, our representation must reflect this distinction between definite and indefinite singulars, as well as the compatibility of genericness with such normally partitive constructions.

(20) illustrates variants of a generic argument type favoured in a number of languages (such as French, or Greek), but restricted in English; so that the expressions involving definite plural and mass nouns of (20.b) and (c) cannot be interpreted generically, unlike their analogues in French, for example, as illustrated by the subject of (22.a) and the object of (b):

(22) a. Les exercices corporels entretiennent l’appétit  
    (the) exertions bodily maintain the appetite  
    b. J’aime le poisson  
    I like (the) fish

Definite plural and mass arguments in English are necessarily partitive. The limitation on the interpretation of (20.b) thus seems indeed to reflect a general restriction (to partitivity) on plural definites in English. Definite singulars are also usually semantically partitive. But in the case of plural and mass arguments, this cannot be suspended with full generics, as revealed by the contrasting interpretative possibilities available in (20). Any generic definite plural or uncountable in must have an attributive:

(23) a. I don’t like the lions *(in zoos)  
    b. The lions *(in zoos) are pathetic

(The asterisk preceding the left brackets indicates that an enclosed sequence cannot be omitted, on a generic interpretation.) And it is thereby less fully generic. These partitivity requirements and other phenomena lead e.g. Vendler to propose that ‘the in front of a noun not actually followed by a restrictive clause [from which he derives all restrictive modifiers – JA] is the sign of a deleted clause to be formed from a previous sentence in the same discourse containing the same noun’ (1967: 52; cf. too Sørensen 1958: 127). I interpret this in terms of the present discussion as a claim that the is a definite partitive. But also, as we have seen, another conclusion we can draw from the preceding is this: in English, whereas plural generics cannot be partitive (unless modified, as in (23), or as in their indefinite congeners, or unless distributives involve partitivity), singular generics are possible, even though singularity apparently involves partitivity.

We gain some perspective on these observations if we take a (brief) look at the expression of analogous distinctions in French and Greek. In French and Greek, plural and uncountable definites may or may not be partitive; and if they are non-partitive they are generic, as in (22). The object of (24.a) is ambiguous between a generic and a partitive reading, as is the subject of (b):

(24) a. Fovate ta skila  
    s/he-is-frightened-of the dogs  
    b. Les lions sont dangereux  
    the lions are dangerous

(Cf. e.g. the comparison of Spanish and English offered by Klein 1976.) Singular arguments in French and Greek may or may not be generic (but note the preference by singular indefinite generics in French for ‘subjective’, discourse-based (deictic) contexts suggested by Herschensohn 1977 – and see further §3.2.5 below), as in English; but in French, unlike as in English or Greek, a plural or mass argument noun must be accompanied by a determiner, even if indefinite, as illustrated by the ‘objects’ in (25), and the indefinite plural is not generic, but necessarily partitive:

(25) a. Georges a acheté *(des/les) timbres  
    George (has) bought (some/the) stamps  
    b. Georges a acheté *(du/le) sucre  
    George (has) bought (some/the) sugar
1.4 Names and generics

I now return to a more direct consideration of names, from which I may be thought to have strayed somewhat. As with the uniquely identifying (9 b-d), singular generic expressions (in particular), like that in (20.a), approximate, semantically, and in some of their morphosyntactic restrictions, to names, in this latter instance to names which appear in an utterance which is otherwise generic, as with (12.a), or (26):

(26) Derek is a dangerous animal

But the lion in (20.a) differs in being non-specific. In this respect it is more like a generic name, such as that in (27.a) (cf. e.g. Sørensen 1958: §87):

(27) a. Man/Woman is a dangerous animal
    b. Modern Man/Woman is a dangerous animal
    c. The most dangerous animal is Man/Woman (cf. Man/Woman is the most dangerous animal)

(27.a) adds another new type of name to the personal and place names I have adduced so far: we have the most general form of collective name (recall (9.d)). Unlike core personal names, generic names, like titles, allow attributivisation, as illustrated by (27.b), and they are clearly much closer to generic nouns than other names; and they are to that extent peripheral, as introducing a ‘generic individual’. However, as with other names, they are used as a definite equative, not a predicative, in sentences like (27.c); and the complement may invert with its subject.

Even more like names in being uniquely identifying and in sharing certain syntactic restrictions is the generic use of those nouns usually labelled abstract. Indeed, in English they (and other mass nouns) share with names incompatibility, in unmarked circumstances, with an associated definite article, as shown in (28.a); and, conversely, in Greek, as arguments, they (and mass nouns in general) take, like names, such an article, as in (b):

(28) a. (*The) Love is a many-splendoured thing
    b. Fovate to thanato
    c. L’art embellit la vie
        the art embellishes the life

In French, generic abstracts and mass nouns in general do not pattern with names in this respect: as with most other occurrences of common nouns in French, a determiner is obligatory, as illustrated by (28.c).

I have singled out specifically abstract mass terms here in so far as they, unlike concrete mass terms, are usually countable when used non-generically:

(29) a. Those truths are self-evident
    b. She is our one hope
    c. You’re a beauty

This parallels the atypical, countable partitive use of names in those Johns or a Mr Smith. (The plural use of uncountables illustrated by Some butters are less harmful introduces an extra component of meaning that we might paraphrase as ‘types of.’) Such abstracts do show the quantification associated with other mass terms, as in much love, a lot of hope, etc. But it may be that they are inherently definite as generics, like names used as arguments, and associated with this, as in the case of names, is countability as a feature of non-generic use. However, the comparable phenomena in Greek and French, as illustrated for abstracts in (28b/c), involve overt definiteness for all mass generics.

Presence of an attributive in English enhances the compatibility of generic abstracts with the, as in the case of names:
(30) a. The love that they once had is no more
    b. The Jessica that we once knew is no more

(Restrictive) attributives introduce partitivity. Of definites, possessives in English are more acceptable generally with generic abstracts and names:

(31) a. Bill’s faith is an inspiration
    b. Our Bill is an inspiration

This reflects the dual status of possessives, as both determiners and attributives – separately expressed, if rather stiltedly, in (32):

(32) The faith of Bill in vitamins surprised us

Core names and core generic abstracts thus seem to share a number of properties (cf. e.g. Zandvoort 1964: §334).

It is accordingly unsurprising that the concepts represented by (generically used) abstracts are commonly personified and these nouns themselves deployed as names:

(33) Grant me an old man’s frenzy,
    Myself I must remake
    Till I am Timon or Lear
    Or that William Blake
    Who beat upon the wall
    Till Truth obeyed his call.

(Yeats, ‘An Acre of Grass’). Abstracts are also a fruitful source of terms of address, socially sensitive vocatives:

(34) (your) Excellency, (your) Majesty, your Honour

But in English names are not usually derived from abstract-based terms of address such as those in (34), except in the form his/her Majesty etc.

1.5 A brief overview Sørensen (1958) attempts to establish the place of names within the system of word classes, and particularly among nominals, on the basis of a battery of morphosyntactic tests (involving compatibility with modes of modification, number, determination, and perfect tense). And one conclusion he offers is that (1958: 159-60) ‘There are no appellatives [common nouns – JA] to which the personal pronouns are more closely related than to proper names, but, on the other hand, their relationship to the definite countables is as close as their relationship to proper names’. This rightly points up the relationship between names and definites, particularly personal pronouns. On his account, too, names are closer to definite uncountables than to countables. But in terms of other properties, some of them discussed here, other relationships than those considered by Sørensen are also salient: among definites, deictics, including particularly deictic personal pronouns, rather than simply definites in general, or personal pronouns in general, share with names the capacity to permit primary identification. In this respect, the classification ‘personal pronoun’ is too coarse, and this is true of other aspects of Sørensen’s taxonomy. For instance, it seems to be the case that it is specifically abstract generic uncountables that approximate (particularly generic – (27)) names.

As well as trying to establish in the preceding the status of names as non-deictic sources of primary identification and to survey the various dimensions along which they share properties with other nominals, I have been at pains to clarify my usage concerning such key concepts as definiteness, deixis, partitivity and specificity. This seemed essential in view of the latitude with which such terms have been understood: compare with the preceding e.g. Givón 1978.

We take up the status of names, and the role of these ‘key concepts’ therein, more explicitly in §3. At this point let us expand on the classification of names.
2 Subcategories of name and systems of nomination

According to Thrane (1980: 214), ‘proper names are non-categorial signs, which means that they do not in any way indicate what kind of thing they are being used to refer to on a given occasion’. On such a view, we could end this section now. In support of this view, Thrane goes on to point out that when presented with a sentence like (35) ‘there is no non-contextual way in which the hearer may learn whether I visited a friend or a town’ (ibid):

(35) I visited Sydney on my way home

and that assigning particular personal names to males or females is simply ‘conventional’ (with some names ‘doing service in both categories’ (ibid)). And he avers: ‘Everything can be given a name: ships, planes, and cars often are’ (ibid). But this seems to me to oversimplify the situation, and, in the case of the last statement at least, to drastically misrepresent it. Though names are subcategorisationally, and thus denominationally, impoverished, it is difficult to maintain the extreme position usually associated with Mill (1843) that names only refer (or only ‘denote’ not ‘connotate’, in his terms). Certainly, subcategorisation of names involves only a few distinctions along the gender dimension, the basic terms on which (animacy, sex) are frequently grammaticalised, and, as we shall see, further distinctions which elaborate upon this dimension. But these distinctions are apparently universally relevant in languages to defining subclasses of name: “languages do not seem to have a category of pure names, in the logician’s sense. Rather there are personal names, place names, color names, and so on” (Chomsky 1975: 45). This is, of course, not to deny the possibility of e.g. hermaphroditic names (‘doing service in both categories’, as Thrane puts it), or the creativity of naming, whereby names may be extended to diverse categories on a personal or figurative basis. In the subsection that follows we confront the denial of categoriality to names in a little more detail.

2.1 The categoriality of names: core and periphery

There is overwhelming cross-linguistic evidence that names are given to people and places (the anthroponyms and toponyms of the onomastic tradition) in the first instance, and that other nominations are extensions of this ‘convention’ (to use Thrane’s term). And in many languages (most) individual personal names are applied either to males or to females, by ‘convention’. The interpretation of (35) nicely illustrates the ambiguity arising from well-defined competing categorisations: person or place? (However, in this case the ambiguity is largely a feature of speech rather than writing, given that the personal name is usually spelled Sidney.) (35) illustrates indeed the grammatical relevance of the ‘conventions’ involved. Normally not all semantic classes are involved in naming (in English we not name usually trees as opposed to people and cities); but particular names invoke certain subclasses of nominal referents.

These subcategories of name may also be morphologically distinguished in some languages. Thus in Basque personal names do not inflect for the locative cases found with (other) nouns, including place names, as illustrated in (36.a) and (b), which contain the allative suffix -rat:

(36) a. gainetarat 'to(wards) the summit'
    b. Pariserat 'to(wards) Paris'
    c. Martinen ganat 'to(wards) Martin'
    d. San Martinerat 'to(wards) St. Martin (town)'

(Lafitte 1962: ch.7). In order to construct an ‘allative’ for the name in (c), the allative of a postposition is deployed (ganat), and the name is in the (possessive) genitive; the direct suffixing of the allative in (d) tells us that this is the name of a locality not a person. This is one indication that personal names are more central to the class than even settlement names.

The conveying of sexual identity by use of a name is varyingly important in different languages: not all languages differentiate between male and female names as starkly as does Latin (see e.g. Chase 1897); but consider the embarrassment experienced by speakers of many languages when they ‘miss-sex’ some individual on the basis of ambiguity of the name or imperfect knowledge of the ‘conventions’. These categorialities are not diminished by labelling them ‘conventional’, or by saying that Providence ‘happens to be the name of a city’ (Vendler 1967: 39). The word table in French is feminine, by ‘convention’; but this is not to deny the appropriateness to the analysis of French of the category of grammatical gender. The assignment of some names is indeed less ‘conventional’: many place names are in origin descriptive, as are nicknames. But such ‘non-conventionality’ is equally not relevant to the categoriality of names, as opposed to many instances of their sources.

To assert the categoriality of names is not to deny that names are in some way ‘less meaningful’ than common nouns and other categories. We know that normally Marybeth will be used...
to refer to a woman (it is categorial to that extent) but it does not denote either the set of girls or a particular semantically defined subset of girls. In this respect, we can say that ‘proper nouns have no meaning at all’ (Katz 1972: 381). On the other hand, the sexually specific categoriality of many personal names is what underlies their use as sex-specifying initial elements in some compounds whose second element is a sexually neutral, as with billy-goat, tom-cat (cf. e.g. Poutsma 1914: ch. XXVII, §14, Obs. III).

I note in passing that, curiously, Katz argues (1972: 381-2), as part of an attempt to discredit semantically based accounts of syntax, that the meaningless of names means that one cannot establish a semantic distinction between names and (common) nouns, though these belong to different syntactic classes. But lack vs. presence of meaning (apart from primitive categoriality) is precisely the appropriate semantic distinction. Katz’ other arguments against semantically based syntax (1972: §8.1) amount to no more than the observation that certain semantic oppositions underlying syntactic distinctions (e.g. ‘count’ vs. ‘mass’) can be neutralised with respect to certain entities: certain entities can be conceptualised in different ways (e.g. fog, mass noun, vs. ground-level clouds, count noun phrase), or their representation can be lexicalised (e.g. trousers as plural – cf. e.g. Poutsma 1914: ch. XXV, §§18-21, on pluralia tantum). These are not arguments against the positing of a semantic basis for syntax, an assumption without which the massive correlations between semantic and syntactic distinctions are difficult to understand. However, this is not as such our concern here. I am assuming a notional foundation for syntax in our discussion.

What unites core names, the central anthroponyms and toponyms, is their anthropocentric origin. This is more salient in some instances than in others. For instance, Basso (1984) argues that ‘the formal organization of Apache place-name systems is directly related to the physical organization of native settlements’ (p.85). Specifically, he sets out to show (1984: 79) ‘that Western Apache place-name terminologies are organized into hierarchies, that the hierarchies may vary in at least two important respects (scale and amount of place-name partitioning), and that such variation is closely associated with variation in the size and social composition of local populations’. This and other studies in the same volume (Tooker 1984) emphasise the importance of understanding the social (rather than simply referential) roles of personal and place names, a perspective not prominent in the philosophical and theoretical linguistic literature on names. Thus, for instance, Maybury-Lewis (1984: 7) remarks concerning the name usage of societies in Central Brazil that ‘names do not … function primarily to identify individuals. Their purpose is rather to transform individuals into persons.’ (This recalls the Latin tag sine nomen persona non est.) While Rosaldo (1984: 22) asserts: ‘the semantic content of Ilongot names more profoundly to the interpersonal play of assertion and reply than to the structural properties of individuation and differentiation’. Naming and re-naming in different cultures serves a variety of functions, from (in Ilongot) marking stages in an individual’s social development and social relationship to others (involving e.g. ‘name avoidance’ or taboo) to more restricted phenomena in other societies like the taking of a ‘pen name’. As concerns place names, Takaki (1984: 73) affirms that in Kalinga (Northern Luzon) ‘regional names used in local discourse … express – among other things – politically colored spatial arrangements. Naming regions thereby projects a political blueprint on physical space.’ Such observations have analogues elsewhere. These phenomena all depend on names being notionally subcategorised in such a way as to permit them various social functions.

By extension we apply names in English to pet animals, some of the terms being specialised as such (Fido etc.), and we use anthropomorphise the animals; and we even give names to familiar inanimate objects (our private transport, for instance), which are likewise anthropomorphised to some extent. There are also less personal namings of inanimates, as with ship ‘names’; but calling a ship Bismarck is still a figurative act. Interestingly, too, such extensions to the inanimate as the latter do not behave like core names in English, for instance, in being usually (in non-naval circles, and unlike small boats – Carroll 1985: 181 – which are perhaps more personal) preceded by an article – in general, not just in a few instances, as with settlement names (The Hague etc.), continents (the Arctic), mountains (the Eiger), and districts (the Weald):

(37) The Bismarck has been sunk

In this respect at least, we should perhaps class these as not core names in English.

We thus cannot lay too much stress on the ‘presence of article criterion’ for a specifically non-name status. Even apart from the parochiality of this criterion, we find that even in English some categories (in addition to ship names) of what are otherwise clearly names, particularly place names, consistently appear with the definite article (see e.g. Carroll 1985: 157). This is true, among place names, of river names (the Trent, the Tay – unlike in Old English), names of channels (the Bosporus)
and seas and oceans (the Baltic) – but not names of lakes (Windermere). So too with cinema and hotel names (the Odeon, the Ritz (Hotel)), and with some other names of buildings and monuments not based on place names (the Barbican, the Cenotaph, the Albert Hall – cf. (*the) Edinburgh Castle, (*the) Westminster Abbey; but note also the place-name-based Westminster Abbey, Waterloo Bridge – Zandvoort 1964: §335). And it is general with plural names, personal and place: the Smiths, the Lothians, the Pyrenees, the Hebrides (cf. e.g. Poutsma 1914: ch. XV, §19, i, ch. XXXI, §26, a). Along with various types of the-free labels for places, these are all names, non-deictic words which provide primary identification of an argument. Whatever the apparent historical reason for the presence of the article in different cases (origin of the name as a common noun, or foreign influence, or ellipsis – Jespersen 1949: §16.13), the the here is not in contrast with other determiners or its/their absence, but, rather its presence is required by certain subcategories of names (or is part of some individual names). We must return, of course, to consider more formally the nature of this requirement, but we can at least say at this point that innovation of the the-construction in the history of river names in English (whatever, again, the motivations for this might have been – cf. Jespersen 1949: §16.13) doesn’t seem to change the essential character of the names.

Cross-linguistic comparisons in this case confirm the name-specific character of such articles as these:

(38) a. France
    b. I Gallia
    c. La France

English lacks an article with country names (except plurals, of course), as in (38.a), and names of languages, while the equivalent country name of (38.b), like other names in Greek, has one. The use of the article in the French of (38.c) is specific to this subcategory of name – and to a number of others – and does not reflect partitivity or genericness, as is associated elsewhere with the definite article in French.

Notice too that these notionally based subcategories are distinguished from each other not merely (in some cases) by the presence or absence of the but also by other morphosyntactic characteristics. Thus, lake and river names, though differing in respective of co-occurrence with the, both take a classifying, descriptive noun to their left, as in (39.a), while seas and oceans, and deserts, take it to the right, like straits and bays, with many of whom it is obligatory, and like island names, but with these latter, unlike sea and ocean names, the is lacking, as shown in (b):

(39) a. (Lake) Windermere, the (River) Thames
    b. the Baltic (Sea), the Atlantic (Ocean), the Gobi (Desert), Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Lundy Island, the Scilly Isles/the Scillies
    c. the Straits of Magellan, the Bay of Biscay, the Isle of Thanet, the Isles of Scilly, the Gulf of Bothnia

(39.c) shows the other major classificatory pattern with straits and islands. With individual names either classificatory pattern may be institutionalised; and the (39.c) pattern is institutionalised for some minor seas (the sea of Azov). This may be related to the fact that with gulfs also this represents the major pattern. Of course, plural island names, like other plural names, take the whatever, as illustrated by the Scilly examples in (39 b-c).

Another dimension of systematic variation illustrated in (39) is discussed by Carroll (1985: ch.7) in terms of the availability or not with complex names of a ‘namehead’, where the ‘namehead’ may substitute for the name as a whole, as with names of beers (Heineken (beer)) or hotels (the Ritz (hotel)). Other classes of name are not so reducible: the Security *(Council).

In line with our notionalist assumptions, these various semantic categories, despite the existence of some exceptional items, correlate systematically with particular kinds of morphosyntactic behaviour. This is typical in language, as revealed by comparable surveys of such phenomena in other languages, such as Herrero Vecino (1997: ch.IV) on Spanish.

The various place designations that we have considered here are all names, though they may (optionally or not) contain common noun elements (Lake Windermere) or be derived from a common noun (the Channel) or involve a de-phrasal structure (the Bay of Biscay) or be plural (the Scillies) or simply retain a the (the Baltic). They are all non-deictic items which offer primary identification, and which show resistance to attributivisation, except by directionals (the northern Baltic etc.), though the scope for attributivisation is greater with plurals (the larger Scillies). We may wish to consider these as non-core names on the basis of the various properties noted here, with settlement names perhaps
constituting the least marked place names. Plural names are also notionally deviant in not ensuring singular uniqueness of identification. But there seems to be no reason to deny them and the less central place names we have considered the status of names. Likewise, the generic (personal) names discussed in §1.4 (Man/Woman) are not core names, as noted there. Nor are collective (institutional) names, though these are variously divergent from the core. For instance, only some of the following set show variation in verbal number concord, as in ____ has/have decided: Ford (converted from a personal name), America (converted from a place name), Government (converted from a common noun), NATO (converted via initialisation and acronymy from a complex name derived from a phrase headed by a common noun) and IBM (converted via initialisation from a complex name based on a phrase of non-names). And usage varies with different speakers. But again, though these are notionally and morphosyntactically non-core, their status as names, in the terms discussed here, seems not to be in doubt.

Huddleston (1984: 229-30) accepts as ‘proper nouns’ such simplex items as the town names London and Hague, while regarding the latter as ‘less central’ as a member of that category because of the requirement that the precede it. But he rejects complexes such as the University of Queensland as a ‘proper noun’, though it does contain a ‘proper noun’, Queensland. The motivation for this is unclear; it seems to reflect an a priori rejection of complex ‘proper nouns’. Instead, Huddleston introduces a distinction between ‘proper noun’, such as London and Queensland, and ‘proper names’, which includes them and the University of Queensland. But this distinction is necessary only if the latter cannot be analysed as a complex ‘proper noun’. That some names are based on other names does not motivate the banishing of the former from the same syntactic category as simplex names. Nor does the presence of common-noun elements in such complexes undermine their status as names. One may agree with Carroll (1985: 167) that in the case of the Willis Avenue Bridge the ‘referent must be a bridge’, even allowing for metaphorical interpretations. But (whatever the implications for the Millian position that ‘names only refer’) this merely makes overt a kind of subcategorisation that may be covert with other names – though not typically with bridge names. Recall here some of the examples in (39a-b). And, as I have indicated, these subcategorisations already necessitate some weakening of the ‘reference-only’ position.

Sørensen (1958: 168) rejects as names items which have a current common noun congener, as we have already observed (in the previous section) concerning the President in (9.d):

An entity like “the Channel” is an appellative – not a proper name; for we can ask “what C(c)hannel” and answer “the channel between England and France”. The fact that we use a capital letter when “the channel” is short for “the channel between England and France” does not affect the grammatical description of “the Channel”. The use of capital letter is a mere convention of speech economy. The convention may be formulated in this way: when we write “the Channel”, then “the channel” is to be taken as short for “the channel between England and France” and for no other entity.

This seems to me rather perverse – and not rendered more persuasive by the appeal to a mere convention of speech economy’. We have here another rhetorical appeal to ‘conventionality’. The ‘convention’ formulated in the passage quoted is effectively an admission that the Channel is used as a name; it is institutionalised as such. If ‘John’ is mentioned, we can ask ‘which one’, if this is unclear in context; similarly, use of ‘the Channel’ might be unclear in context. The main difference is that the alternatives to the intended referent of ‘John’ are all identified by the same name, whereas the alternatives to ‘the Channel’ are entities to which the same definitised common noun as can be applied to ‘the Channel’ – and is homophonous with it, being the source of the noun-to-name conversion that underlies ‘the Channel’ – can also be applied. But in common usage ‘the Channel’ is used very generally, in British English at least, as a primary identifier of the argument. And while use of a capital may not affect the grammatical description of “the Channel”, it does reflect it, I suggest, and specifically the status of the Channel as a name (one which has a common noun cognate); and it enables us in writing to distinguish the name from this cognate. One wonders what Sørensen would have made of the Chunnel, a name based on blending rather than simple conversion from a common noun?

The United States is rejected as a name by Sørensen (1958: 168) on a similar basis to that appealed to with respect to the Channel. But this again is clearly institutionalised as a name, and as such determines singular concord. Of course, there will be borderline cases, as with all questions of usage: at what point does one talk about institutionalisation? What of the dog in (9.b)? Does it represent a micro-institutionalisation? But it seems clear that occurrence with the definite article in
English does not preclude name status, even if there exists a common noun cognate: if I may be permitted a suggestion of grammatical anti-Arianism, the Lord belongs to the same category as God.

As is familiar, most (and particularly personal) names in English do reject the definite article unless in the particular context identification is not assured, as in (40.a), or there is reference to (especially diachronic) instances or aspects of the entity whose name is being used, as in (29.b), or in (40.b):

(40) a. the Bill with red hair
    b. the young Byron, the France I’m fond of

(Other more specialised usages involving the are noted by Jespersen (1949: §16.3s, for instance.) We shall have to investigate in what follows what grammatical mechanisms are involved here. With respect to cases like (40.a) Huddleston (1984: 130-1) again deploys his proposed distinction between ‘proper name’ and ‘proper noun’. He says with respect to the examples in (41) that ‘of the two NPs Jones and the same Jones only the first is a proper name, although both NPs have a proper noun as head’:

(41) a. Jones arrived
    b. We weren’t talking about the same Jones

But again this terminological innovation is unnecessary – and problematical: what sort of category is ‘proper name’? It does not seem to be on a par with other categories or subcategories of words. As Huddleston points out, ‘any central proper noun behaves like Jones’ in occurring as in (41.b). We have another common circumstance, apart from in nomination, where a name does not serve to uniquely identify an argument: identification in (40.a) is associated with the whole phrase. As indicated, we return to these concerns below, in §3.3.

What interests me at this point is that such phenomena as are illustrated by (40) and (41.b) have been grouped with that illustrated by (42.a), involving the subcategory of calendrical names (cf. e.g. Quirk & Greenbaum 1973: 76):

(42) a. during the Easter of that year
    b. every Easter, last January, some Tuesday, that Passover
    c. I hate Mondays (in term time)
    d. I hate Monday

But (42.b) illustrates that calendar terms can be much more generally determined than other names, and (c) shows pluralisation unaccompanied by definiteness (cf. the Smiths etc.) as well as possible presence of an attributive without a preceding article. (42.d) seems to be generic. And this variety of patterning is quite common and unmarked – unlike, say, I’ve detested every Brian I’ve encountered. Such calendar terms are not expected to be necessarily uniquely identifying. And they are deictically specific when used as names, so that (43.a) is interpreted as (b):

(43) a. He arrives on Friday
    b. He arrives on the Friday of this week
    c. He arrives Tomorrow

This suggests that such terms are hybrids: count names – or rather, deictically restricted names that can also be used as count nouns, given that the two areas of usage are quite distinct in their properties. Yesterday, Tomorrow and Today (43.c) are perhaps even more obviously an amalgam of name and deictic term. Again we must return to this. Here I merely point to this phenomenon as involving yet another type of name (different from person or place) and again illustrating the syntactic relevance of a notional subcategorisation of names.

The use of numbers for the hours of the day does not pattern in this way, but rather they are straightforward names:

(44) a. He arrived (every day) at 5
    b. *He arrived at every 5/at last 5/at some 5

Compare these with (42). Paradoxically, perhaps, the numerals of the clock are more centrally name-like than the names of the days of the week. Here we have another subcategory of names, one of hour
names based on numerals. And the structure of terms for the divisions of the hours, including their interaction with the hour names, is still more complex.

My aim here, however, is not a comprehensive (notional) classification of categories of name in English and their morphosyntactic properties. Indeed, some of the parameters of such a classification are still uncertain; so that well-known classifications of names such as that contained in Quirk et al. (1985) are, as e.g. Lipka (2000: 193) indicates, incomplete, as is even the extensive taxonomy of (specifically) place names developed by Baker & Carmony (1975). Carroll’s (1985) taxonomies are likewise open-ended. I offer at this point merely some evidence of the viability of such a project. The diagram illustrates what I see as the relative centrality of personal names with respect to various other classes of name, with settlement names being shown in their turn as central to the class of place names.

Diagram: The relative centrality of some classes of names

The centrality of personal names in the class of names is parallel to the centrality of personal pronouns (and particularly those signalling speech act participants) in the system of deictics: *I* and *you* label the basic participants in the speech act situation; *this* and *here* and *now* and deictic *that* and *there* and *then* label entities located with respect to the primary participant (with or without an act of ostension).

Nor am I directly concerned here with the historical sources of names, though the study of these is relevant not just to the general development of names but also, as noted in passing above, to often still-productive derivational processes responsible for name creation. This aspect thus demands some attention here, as follows.

2.2 The sources of names and of naming systems Most – perhaps all – naming traditions clearly originate in processes of naming based on common nouns. Even *lall* names typically derive from children’s mispronunciations of existing names or common nouns, or adults’ imitation of such childish (in)capacities. It is unusual for such a name to constitute a de novo creation. My personal experience contains only one (apparent) instance. And even the literary inventors of ‘pen-names’ are remarkably uncreative in this respect.

Classifications of sources of personal names such as that offered by Dolan (1972: 10) are excessively parochial – though this can perhaps be partly excused by the narrow focus of the work. But his classification can serve as a familiar starting point for a look at the sources of names. He distinguishes English surnames as in origin by-names, or additional, differentiating names, based on place names (of place of origin or residence – *Ford*, *Gates*), on personal names (overtly derived from the name of a related person, usually the father – *Williamson*), on occupational nouns (*Butcher*, *Slaughter*) and on terms which originate as ‘nicknames’ (cf. e.g. Pulgran 1954: 16). Despite some vagaries in the usage of ‘nickname’ and similar terms such as ‘so(u)briquet’, which have not always been kept entirely distinct from ‘by-name’ (see e.g. the *OED* entries), Dolan here seems to be using the term nicknames in the most familiar sense of additional names based on ‘characterising phrases taken from the common vocabulary’ (Clark 1992: 460), which he exemplifies with surnames like *Small* and *Ambler*. The second two of Dolan’s classes draw in an obvious way on common vocabulary; the others draw on other names. This is typical of the sources of names.
Traditions of assigning basic personal names, as opposed to by-names, also overwhelming originate in the use of common vocabulary. (And popular awareness of this is reflected in the (apparently profoundly anti-Millian) common enquiry: ‘What does your name mean?’) Something of the range of sources is revealed by what Pulgram (1954: 9) describes as Hilka’s ‘fairly comprehensive list’ of sources arising from his work on Sanskrit names, Pulgram’s ‘résumé’ of which is reproduced here in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. The realm of the gods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Deva-‘God’ (in compounds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Divine names (in compounds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The realm of nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Minerals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Other elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Time and circumstances of birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Time of life; kinship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Geographical situation; ethic relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Dress; finery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Physical appearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Human mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. General attributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Intelligence or lack of it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Character; temperament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Human conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Way of life; food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Happiness; luck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Joy; love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Religion; cult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Science; philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Public service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Various other concreta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Titles (sovereign; honorary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. [Women’s names]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Hilka’s list of sources for personal names

(The sources in section 1 of the Table are other names.) Section 10 (not to mention 12) in the table still leaves the classification open-ended. However, Pulgram argues that the same range of sources characterise a range of languages of different families examined by him, and affirms: ‘I have found no names which ultimately and basically are not part of the current or past lexicon of a language’ (1954: 19).

However that may be, what is more difficult is to determine whether in origin names in different traditions, even if based on common-noun vocabulary, are ‘characterising’ in all cases – i.e. are essentially freshly applied ‘nicknames’ that are basic rather than additional. Is even the initial application of a common noun or other lexical element as a name necessarily ‘descriptive’? This would be a property shared by names like Chirpie with many lowest level hyponyms, such as willow warbler (cf. e.g. García Mouton 1987); and this is perhaps associated with the inclusion of these latter in the more inclusive sense of ‘name’ discussed initially.

Certainly, typically names, even nicknames, can quickly become opaque to a common-noun interpretation. Thus, in Mohawk, names have a variety of transparent sources, including verbs: ‘Most Mohawk proper names referring to persons and places are verbs’ (Mithun 1984: 46) – cf. (45):

(45) Wathahi:ne (= ‘she takes up the path’)

1. The realm of the gods
2. The realm of nature
3. Time and circumstances of birth
4. Time of life; kinship
5. Geographical situation; ethnic relation
6. Dress; finery
7. Physical appearance
8. Human mind
9. Human conditions
10. Various other concreta
11. Titles (sovereign; honorary)
12. [Women’s names]
And some names have to do with the circumstances of birth. But ‘speakers are not at all disturbed that many of the names they use continually are now uninterpretable except as names’ (Mithun 1984: 49).

Anglo-Saxon names, both simplex and bipartite, also have usually rather transparent common-word cognates (nouns and adjectives, in this case) which again, presumably, are their historical sources: e.g. *Hild/, cf. *hild* ‘war’, *Godwine/, cf. *god* ‘good’, *wine* ‘friend’. But individual recorded Anglo-Saxon nominations in the historical period do not seem to reflect an intention to represent, by use of particular elements, personal characteristics or circumstances of the nominee, but rather attempts to indicate kinship in terms of shared elements or at least alliteration of initial elements (Clark 1992: 458): cf. the related West Saxon royal names *Cerdic, Cynric, Ceawlin, Cuýa, Ceadda, Cenbeorht, Ceawalla*. Such attempts are at best inconsistently pursued by the late Old English period (Colman 1992: 26). But they are themselves difficult to reconcile with a ‘characterising’, or descriptive, function for Old English name-formations. And names like *Daegnieht* ‘day-night’ (Colman 1992: 26) are difficult to associate with such a function. This is probably what Clark means by saying that ‘the combining of themes into compounds was ruled by onomastic, not semantic choice’ (1992: 458).

Whatever rules of combination there are do not reflect the semantics of the common-noun cognates. Generally in language, we find rapid ‘de-etymologisation’ of names, even nicknames and other by-names. Thus, productive synchronic *personal-naming systems* tend not to be based synchronically on common words, even if the cognate common word persists in the language.

Certainly, I have already noted that some Mohawk namings are descriptive (Mithun 1984), and this is not unparalleled. Maxwell affirms that ‘cultures dependent on oral tradition often exhibit a greater richness in the semantic significance and structure of personal names’ (1984: 25). Name ‘meanings’ can assume considerable cultural significance in literate societies also: consider, for example, the rich Roman and medieval European tradition of name etymologising for exegetical, literary and onomastic purposes described by Robinson (1993: part V). Mitchell concludes a plea for more attention to ‘Anglo-Saxon onomastics’ thus (1993: 217-8):

Far too much attention was accorded to onomastics by the Anglo-Saxons for the poetic results to be limited to an occasional adventitious subtlety or a random epithet. But in approaching all these questions, it seems above all important that we bear in mind the essential difference between the literary onomastics of the Anglo-Saxons and that of our own writers today. Their precedents then were the sacral etymologies of the Bible, the commentaries of the Fathers, the exuberant interpretations of Isidore and the Irish writings, all of which encouraged a learned searching out of etymological significance in names received from tradition. Our own precedents, by contrast, are the explicit, moralizing names of late medieval drama and the comic sobriquets of Congreve or Dickens. On the whole, their tradition was subtle, learned, and artful, while ours tends to be spontaneous and obvious.

But the medieval tradition and modern literary practices are very specialised, parasitic domains, and the general evolution of names is towards de-sematicisation, of individual nominations and in the system itself. Typically, for the speakers of a particular language there exists a pool of names that may be accorded to persons, distinct from common words and not synchronically related, except playfully or mystically, to any common-word cognates there may be.

The system of nomination may be designed to offer maximum differentiation, as with the Germanic principles of combining elements in the formation of the preponderant dithematic names in such a way as to allow both variation and kinship continuity (Woolf 1939): *Æbelstan, Æpelmeor*, etc. Such a system does provide for considerable variation – though the ‘uniqueness’ of individual Anglo-Saxon and other Germanic names has been somewhat exaggerated – e.g. by Dolan (1972: 2-3, 11), according to whom, in the case of Old English the alleged ‘infinite variety’ of naming (1972: 3) involves allegedly ‘thousands of almost unpronounceable names’ (1972: 11); and, as we have noted, it is limited by the desire to show kinship. Given the identificatory function of names, one might expect the capacity for variation to be typical of naming systems. But, as we have anticipated in the preceding discussion, many other systems reflect more saliently other functions for names. Marking of *kinship* is often important in different ways (one variant of which the Anglo-Saxon system also illustrates), and this can reduce variety of naming even more strictly than do the Anglo-Saxon practices. Thus, for example, systems like the Greek one, wherein the names assigned to the first two male and the first two female children are those of their grandparents, lead (together with limitations imposed by the traditionally circumscribed pool of names) to there being whole villages where most of the inhabitants have only a few ‘first’ names among themselves. And the range of surnames is also, for some other and some related reasons, rather restricted too. For various official purposes Greek
names thus include a specification of the paternal name as well. Even local uniqueness is difficult to achieve in such a system: *Pios Kostas*; is an even more frequent question than *Which Kevin?*

Rather widely used for differentiation are other kin-based systems, such as the additional system of patronyms deployed in, say, Russian (*Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky*) or Icelandic (*Egill Skallagrimsson*). And various other naming mechanisms allow for differentiation. By-names are one means, as are diminutivisations – signalled by affixation (*Johnny*), shortening (*Jo*), more or less conventionalised phonological modification (*Jack*) or some combination of these (*Peggy*). These latter increase the identificatory power of the system by allowing differentiation associated with size or age. But they also have a social function, typically hypocoristic, affection-expressing (ironic or not). And both diminutives and many by-names (occupation-based, nicknames), though descriptive in origin, well illustrate the de-semanticisation associated with adoption of a term as a name, as with the evolution, noted above, of many by-names into surnames. Though again partially descriptive in origin, surnames can again become de-semanticised, as with my own name. Maxwell (1984) provides a description of the structure of Kadayan personal names which gives an idea of the kinds of elaboration in nomination that may take place. Kadayan names include as basic a personal name and patronymic and, if appropriate, the element *Haji* (to mark a past pilgrim to Mecca), but to these may be prefixed honorific terms and titles; nicknames are also deployed, and names may be changed, as in other cultures, in order to elude some affliction.

A different kind of differentiation, based on the kind of social functioning of naming alluded to in §2.1, is well illustrated by the Ilongot practices described by Rosaldo (1984). He distinguishes (1984: 11-2) five types of names that may be assigned to an individual, with different chronological and/or social functions, ranging from ‘infant names’ to ‘in-law names’, the latter being names used by persons not permitted to know the individual’s adult ‘true name’, which is unique within the social group and lasts for the individual’s lifetime. He also illustrates (1984: 15-9) the complex interplay of associations, word play and social interaction (as well as phonological principles) that can drive the formal evolution of a particular name. These other functions of names and naming emphasise the frequently dynamic character of naming. This is also manifested in the instability of the transparency /opacity of particular name forms and the processes that derive them. Here and in other languages name differentiation is contingent on subsystems serving various social functions.

One important, if rather obvious, conclusion to be drawn from all this is that, though de-semanticisation is typical, many names contain elements which in origin are descriptive and are transparently and accessibly so. This conclusion is important, in view especially of place-name examples like those in (39), repeated here, some of which may, the rest of which must, be accompanied by a descriptive noun:

(39) a. (Lake) Windermere, the (River) Thames
b. the Baltic (Sea), the Atlantic (Ocean), the Gobi (Desert), Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Lundy Island, the Scilly Isles/the Scillies
c. the Straits of Magellan, the Bay of Biscay, the Isle of Thanet, the Isles of Scilly, the Gulf of Bothnia

A name may incorporate a descriptive, subcategorisational noun; in this case, subcategorisation is overt, and systematic (cf. Carroll on “rule-scheme strategies for name generation” (1985: 144). Indeed, this is typically the case with many types of place name (cf. e.g. Gómez de Silva 1994: 209), formed from a name and a descriptive noun indicating its category, such as those in (39). Other names consist entirely of descriptive elements, with or without *the*:

(46) a. the Black Hills, the Dead Sea
b. Long Island, Thunder Bay, Newtown

The bases are often not cognitively salient. They may be ‘fossilized’, in the terminology of Giering et al. (1980: 66). But even fossilisation does not obscure a subcategorisationally relevant term (*Sea, Bay* etc.).

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formal evolution of a particular name. These other functions of names and naming emphasise the frequently dynamic character of naming. This is also manifested in the instability of the transparency/opacity of particular name forms and the processes that derive them.

The examples in (39) can be seen as involving a kind of \textit{eponymy}: in the Straits of Magellan we have a derived name formed from a name and a descriptive element. Other names are formed by simple eponymy: the name of the founder may be taken as a collective name, institutionalised as the name of a corporation (otherwise typically formed by abbreviation and where possible acronymy). This traditional name-to-name eponymy is, of course, to be distinguished from eponymy in the extended sense of name-to-noun conversions (Borkin 1972, Clark 1978). Thus, \textit{Ford} is a personal name and the name of a corporation, but it is also a name-based common noun in examples like (47.a):

(47) a. Bill drives a Ford
b. Bill needs a new hoover

For many speakers the name base is not salient, and in some cases the noun comes to be used for any such product irrespective of provenance, usually with loss of initial capitalisation in writing, as, for many speakers, with the item in (47.b). This is one respect in which (if we return here to the initial concerns of this section) it is misleading for Thrane to declare: ‘Everything can be given a name: ships, planes, and cars often are’ (1980: 214). Only ‘pet cars’ (e.g. Genevieve) or other one-offs (Bluebird) have names; other cars are referred to with name-based nouns. The same is true of \textbf{nouns of nationality}. In both these cases, the items concerned can appear in predicative position (with an indefinite article):

(48) a. Bill’s car is a Ford
b. Bill is an American

And they show the usual range of modifiers associated with common nouns. In this respect, the use of initial capitalisation is perhaps misleading, in that it reflects the name status of the base from which the item is derived rather than anything to do with the item itself. In the section which follows we shall be concerned not merely with the status and character of names as a syntactic category, in the light of the properties discussed in §1, but also with aspects of the ‘micro-structure’ of names as revealed particularly in the rather cursory survey of the natural history of names contained in the present section.
3 The morphosyntax of names

3.1 The place of names in the system of syntactic categories

Anderson (1997) groups names together with pronouns and determiners as all referential but non-predicable. Other categories except functors, the category which carries the expression of the functions of arguments (to which we return below), may be predicators. Thus, all of nouns, verbs and adjectives, which are both predicative and referential, both occur in the positions in (49), as predicators, and as shown in (50), can be the antecedents of anaphora, by substitution or ellipsis:

(49) a. Fay reddened  
b. Fay is fair  
c. Fay is a blond

(50)a. Fay may leave but I don’t think so  
b. Fay is fair but Bill isn’t  
c. Fay is a blond but Bill isn’t

The equivalents of (49) are not available to names, pronouns and determiners; when they occur as a complement to be, for instance they are not predicative but part of an equative predication, as in (5):

(5) a. This is Basil  
b. Basil is him  
c. Basil is that guy over there  
d. Basil is the one who married Clotilde

In English the a of (49.c) is the only apparent determiner to occur with a predicative nominal; in other languages its equivalent may be absent (and we return below, in §3.2.5, to its status in English). Compare English with French and Greek once more:

(51) a. Peter is a doctor  
b. Pierre est médecin  
c. O Petros ine jatros

However, names, pronouns and determiners – what we might call together determinatives – are, of course, eminently suitable antecedents (and names and deictics, as primary identifiers, are characteristic antecedents). And it is they that introduce non-sentential arguments: the subjects in (5) and the complements in (5 a-b) are arguments constituted by a name or pronoun; the complements in (5 c-d) are arguments in which a ‘transitive pronoun’ is complemented by a noun phrase.

In some languages the grouping of personal names and personal pronouns is marked overtly. Thus, Biggs (1969) recognises for Maori, alongside his other word classes of ‘nouns’, ‘universals’ (roughly, non-stative verbs), ‘statives’ and ‘locatives’, a class of ‘personals’:

Personals include all personal names and names of things which have been personified, e.g. a meeting-house which bears the name of an ancestor. The names of the months are personals. The personal pronouns are a special subclass of personals which differ slightly from other personals in the way they are used … A PERSONAL IS ANY BASE WHICH TAKES THE PERSONAL ARTICLE A AFTER THE LOCATIVE PARTICLE KI.

(Biggs 1969: 53). The main difference alluded to in this quotation is that, unlike personal pronouns, personal names and ‘locatives’ (including crucially place names) take the personal article a in subject position, as exemplified in (8.a), repeated here

(8) a. Ka hariruu a Mere ki a Rongo  
aspect shake-hands art Mary with art Rongo  
(‘Mary shakes hands with Rongo’)

The subject personal pronoun in (52) lacks a preceding a:

(52) a. E titiro ana ahau ki a ia  
asp look asp I at art her/him  
(‘I am looking at her/him’)
But (52) does show $ki + a + + p e r s o n a l ~ p r o n o u n$, as expected of a ‘personal’.

Conversely to determinatives, operators, that is, members of the category realising finiteness when the latter has word status, as manifested by the first auxiliary in a (finite) sequence in English (cf. e.g. Huddleston 1984: §4.4), are predicative, as in (53.a) – compare the finite verb in (b) – but not referential, as illustrated by (53.c), in which the antecedent is the construction headed by love (including Fred – see below) and not that headed by may:

(53) a. Fred may come back
    b. Fred tends to come back
    c. Fred may love her but I don’t believe so/it

The finiteness category is not referential. This is complicated by the fact that the operator may also primarily realise tense/aspect, which can be part of the target of anaphora, as it is in all but the (a) example in (54);

(54) a. They say Fred may leave but I don’t believe so/it
    b. They say Fred will leave but I don’t believe so/it
    c. They say Fred has left but I don’t believe so/it
    d. They say Fred left but I don’t believe so/it

In each of (54 b-d) the tensing is part of the antecedent, whether it is carried by an operator (54 b-c) or the main verb (54.d); in (54.a) the operator is outside of the antecedent, as it is in (53), and in (55), in which the operator is not simply a carrier of tense but is predictive:

(55) Bill says that’ll be the postman but I don’t believe so/it

This is related to the periphrastic status as tense carriers for the verb of some uses of operators – or, more generally, auxiliaries. And this need not concern us here.

Finiteness is a functional category, and it may thus be expressed either, together with various secondary grammatical categories (modality/tense/aspect/voice), as a separate word, as in (52.a) and the main clauses in (54 a-c), or along with a main verb, as in (54.d). Operator auxiliaries express finiteness, but other uses of the auxiliaries, such as that italicised in (56), have the syntax of non-finite verbals:

(56) Fred may have come back

Referentiality is also functional, in so far as such notions as definiteness and partitivity can be expressed analytically, as a separate word, a referential or determinative element (as typically in English), or along with a noun and/or adjective. And, just as the finiteness element confers sentencehood on the construction it heads, so referentiality licences argumenthood.

Anderson (1997) suggests that these various phenomena express the system of categories shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>{N}</th>
<th>{N;P}</th>
<th>{N:P}</th>
<th>{P;N}</th>
<th>{P}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>determination</td>
<td>noun</td>
<td>adjective</td>
<td>verb</td>
<td>finiteness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(functional)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(functional)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: A system of syntactic categories

Each pair of braces in the Table encloses a categorial representation. All of the lexical (non-functional) categories involve a combination of the notions N (referential) and P (predicable), which licence their behaviour in (50) and (49) respectively; each of the functional categories in Table 2 lacks one of these notions, reflecting their non-predicability (determiners) or non-referentiality (operators). There is one further functional category, which involves absence of both these notions, the category of functor, which expresses the role of arguments in predication, thus $\{\}$ (which should be added to the representations in Table 2. The functor may be expressed analytically (as well as positionally), as in (57.a), or morphologically (as well as positionally), as in (b), or merely positionally, as in (c):
Lexical categories thus necessarily involve both notions, functional categories not necessarily even one. The lexical categories differ in the proportion of each notion present, so that with nouns N predominates over P, and with verbs there is the reverse, with the dominant notion being placed to the left of the semi-colon in the representations in Table 2, whereas with adjectives the colon indicates that N and P are 'equally preponderant'. ‘\{N:P\}’ is equivalent to ‘\{N;P\}&\{P;N\}’.

The representations in Table 2 allow the expression of appropriate natural classes: the representations of the class of potential predicators contains P; the representations of the class of verbals contains a unilaterally dominant P; the representations of functional categories contain fewer than two notions; etc. (Anderson 1997: §2.5.1). They also express various relations of gradience in terms of the proportion of the two notions N and P present (Anderson 1997: §2.6): for instance, the intermediate status of adjectives with respect to verbs and nouns correlates with the mutual preponderance of N and P in their representation – so that, for instance, whereas most adjectives in English take, like nouns, (non-subject) complements that are marked with an overt functor, as in (57.a) (cf. his fondness for Mary), some adjectives behave like verbs in taking a ‘bare complement’, as in (58):

(57) a. He was fond of Mary
b. He liked her
c. He liked Mary

(58) She was like Mary

(cf. She resembled Mary and She was similar to Mary). These aspects of the system need not concern us directly here, however.

Each of the categories in Table 2 is lexicalised in English: that is, each represents a distinct word class. In some languages there is no adjective word class, and this reflects the complexity (markedness) of the representation of adjectives (Anderson 1997: §§2.3.1, 2.4). Further categories, and classes, can be allowed for in terms of combinations of these categorial representations. Thus, many adverbs can be interpreted as a combination of a functor and a determinative, as represented in (59):

(59) {{loc}}
   | {N}
   : :
   there

‘Loc(ative)’ is a secondary category (enclosed within inner braces) associated with the functor category, and in (59) it is shown as having a determinative complementing it, thus dependent on it, as is normal with functors; but in this case the dependency is word-internal. Compare (60.a), which represents a construction in which the word it complements the head of the construction at:

(60) a. {{loc}}
    : :
    : {N}
    : :
    at it

b. { } ⇒ \{ /[N]\}

(60.b) is the lexical redundancy that requires each functor to be accompanied by an argument (specified to the left of the slash), whether it is incorporated, as in (59) or not (60.a).

Like adverbs, finite main verbs involve a complex categorisation of the character of (61):
Pret(rite) is again a secondary category. Compare (62.a), with the verb dependent on a separate finiteness element:

(62) a. \{P\{pret\}\} → \{P;N\}
    had left

b. \{P\} ⇒ \{P/{P;N}\}

(62.b) is a general lexical redundancy that requires that every \{P\} is complemented by a \{P:N\}, internally, as in (61), or not (62.a).

In these terms we can represent the syntactic structure of a simple sentence as in (63):

(63) \{P\{pret\}\} → \{abs\}/\{P;N\}/\{abs\},\{loc\}/\{loc\} → \{N\}/\{N\} → \{N\} → they lay there

Abs(olute) (roughly, ‘neutral’ or ‘theme’) is another secondary functor category, in this case the unmarked, semantically least specific one, governing here, as generally with functors (but in this case non-overtly), a determinative phrase. These functor notions are also categories whose presence in the representation of the verb – again to the right of the slash – prescribes its complementation: here the verb category ‘\{P:N\}’ is subcategorised for an ‘\{abs\}’ and a ‘\{loc\}’ functor. The subject they is dependent on both the ‘\{abs\}’ of the finiteness category and the ‘\{abs\}’ required by the valency of the basic verb dependent on finiteness.

Again, these aspects do not concern us directly. And I shall not go into the nature of valency restrictions or the mechanism that associates an ‘\{abs\}’ with the finiteness category (cf. Anderson 1997: §3.3), except to say with respect to the latter that this ‘\{abs\}’ is an unsubcategorised-for functor phrase introduced in response to the requirement that every predicator has an abs argument (cf. Anderson 1997: 166, and the references given there). This is an analogue of the requirement that subjects are universal in predications, but renders this latter stipulation unnecessary (appropriately, as it is false). I shall refer to this relation as a ‘free abs’. Its empty argument slot is filled by an expletive (it’s raining) or via ‘raising’, as in (63): the argument highest on the subject selection hierarchy in the lower predication shares its argument with the free abs. Subject-hood is interpreted, in accordance with the assumptions of ‘case grammar’, as derivative of the array of functors required by the predicator, and, in particular, subject-formation is interpreted as a variant of ‘raising’ – attachment to the ‘\{abs\}’ dependent on ‘\{P\}’. They in (63) is a shared argument whose upper attachment overrules the normal placement, as an argument of ‘\{P;N\}’, to the right of ‘\{P;N\}’.

I merely want to illustrate here some major dimensions provided for by the system of representation. It would perhaps be helpful, however, to contrast (63) with (64.a), which contains an operator and thus distinct expression of finiteness:
(64) a. 

```
{P} : {abs} :: {P;N/{abs},{loc}} :: {abs} : : {loc} 
[N] : : {N} 
```

```
they may lie there
```

b. They may lie there but I do not believe so

Here again the free abs shares its argument with the subject of the lower predicator, i.e. the argument highest on the subject-selection hierarchy (subject being a derived notion). The construction headed by the \{P;N\} in (64.a), i.e. they lie there, is the antecedent of so in (64.b). The may is not referential: recall here the discussion of (53) etc. above. Let us return now to names, however, and specifically their categorisation.

3.2 Names and other determinatives Traditionally in grammatical studies (though with the notable exception of the later Stoics), names have been considered to be a sub-class of noun. Recently this is robustly formulated by Gary-Prieur: ‘… je rejoins le point de vue de la grammaire traditionelle, qui presente N[om]p[propre] et N[om]c[commun] comme deux categories lexicales subdivisant celle du nom (1994: 243). Some grammarians do acknowledge that ‘with proper names we have reached a stage part way between noun and pronoun’ (Strang 1962: 99). And, interestingly, Roberts, while suggesting that ‘personal and demonstrative pronouns pattern very much like proper nouns … except in one respect: the pronouns have antecedents’ (1962: 22), uses a footnote to exclude first and second person pronouns from the last clause, thereby apparently identifying them syntactically with names. A status for names as a sub-class of nouns is maintained even by some grammarians (Aarts & Aarts 1982: 26-7) despite their having demonstrated that names do not show any of the positive syntactic criteria that they themselves use to differentiate between count and mass nouns; and elsewhere this status is apparently unquestioned (see e.g. Quirk & Greenbaum 1973: §4.2). An extreme of this position is reached in Giering et al. (1980: 59):

> There is no strict line of division between proper and common nouns. As a matter of fact, nouns are frequently used as both in keeping with communicative requirements.

While the first statement is perhaps not controversial, Giering et al.’s illustration of the second seems to involve a suggestion that smith and Smith are different uses of the same noun, and likewise the lion and The Lion (as a pub name); and these are, further, not differentiated from the usage of e.g. He is a new Hemingway vs. Hemingway (family name).

However, the system of Table 2, drawn from Anderson (1997), groups names, as determinatives, together with determiners and pronouns as members of a distinct word class from (common) nouns, a class represented as the category \{N\}. This seems to be justified in languages like English and French by the distribution: the core instances of names and pronouns pattern like determined phrases, phrases headed by determiners. Determinatives are the heads of arguments, and may be transitive or intransitive. Names as arguments, like personal pronouns and definite determiners, are specifically definite determinatives: shared identification (on the part of speaker and addressee) of arguments headed by such elements is assumed. And various pragmatic, semantic and syntactic phenomena follow from this, some of them illustrated in §1 above.

The term ‘core’ here is crucial, both in relation to the membership of the class and to its syntactic behaviour. Gross distributional behaviour is not a reliable guide to the identification of word classes. In pursuit of her assimilation of names to (common) nouns, Gary-Prieur affirms that ‘… un nom propre peut apparaître dans toutes les distributions caractéristiques du nom à l’intérieur du S[syntagme]/N[ominale]’ (1994: 243). But the various constructions showing names used with articles, demonstratives etc. surveyed in part II of her book all most plausibly involve derived forms based on simple names, as discussed in §3.3 below. Her descriptions of (the interpretations of) the name in (65.a) as ‘métaphore’ (1994: 131) and that in (65.b) as ‘métonomique’ (1994: 173) are an admission of this:
These are name-to-noun eponymies. Their existence supports the distinction between name, ‘\{'N\}'
and noun, ‘\{'N;P\}' . This distinction is based on the non-predicability of names, which follows from
their representation as ‘\{'N\}' only.

‘\{'N\}' and ‘\{'P\}' are functional categories, however. And we expect them to be closed-class;
lexical categories, on the contrary, are open-class. The set of names in a language like English is
extensive and extensible, however. But this extension is not of the character of lexical classes, whose
elaboration involves denotative differentiation. The categoriality of names is not normally extended
by increase in membership. For such reasons, as Vendler observes (1967: 39), ‘some linguists regard
proper names as a single morpheme’. Thus, extensibility may not undermine the categorial
assignment proposed for names, given its distinctive character in the case of names. However, it
suggests that this simple categorisation is perhaps missing something.

Also, functional categories are frequently expressed morphologically. This is not the case
with names, no doubt for reasons to do with their extensibility. But at least in some languages other
subcategories of determinative may be expressed only analytically: English has no morphologically-
expressed articles, for instance. So perhaps this last observation is not a problem. But again the
general absence of morphological expression of names suggests that something is lacking in our
characterisation, and not only recognition of the extensibility of the class.

More problematical, it seems to me, is the fact that in languages like Greek, as we have
observed, names in arguments are expressed distinctly from definiteness. Recall (6):

(6) a. Aftos ine o Vasilis
    this is (the) Basil
b. Dhen idha to Vasili
   not I-saw (the) Basil

This coincides with other evidence that expression of definite determination and name are separable.
Names as complements of naming verbs and as vocatives are not definite. And this, recall, is reflected
overtly in the syntax of Greek and other languages:

(7) c. Onomazete Vasilis/Ton lene Vasili
   he-is-called Basil/Him they-call Basil
d. Vassili!

This means that in a language like English names seem to involve two different categorisations, one
incorporating definiteness, whereas Greek names are consistently categorised as lacking definiteness.
Let us approach an attempt to characterise what is going on here via a similar, but not identical,
discrepancy.

3.2.1 Demonstratives  In Greek, as in a number of other languages, instead of there being
demonstrative determiners, the definite article is optionally accompanied by such deictic elements, as
illustrated by (66), and these deictics cannot themselves be used transitively, unlike this/that:

(66) (aftos/ekinos) o astinomikos
     (this/that) the policeman

These (proximal/distal) deictics seem here to be specifiers of the definite article. Core specifiers are
closed-class items whose syntax is not that of either head or complement, but is associated with some
(other) category which they constitute a characteristic dependent of (though in some instances that
category may be very general – cf. e.g. Anderson (in preparation) on only).

The classic instance of a such an element in English is very, which selects as a head for it to
depend on an adjective, as in very pretty, or a derivative of such, as in very prettily. We can thus
characterise the structure of (67.a) as in (b):

(67)a. She is very pretty
The categorical representation of *very* introduces a governing node of the same category above the item being specified, here ‘{N;P}’, shown to the right of the backward slash in that representation. In this instance the valency of *is* (to the right of the slash) involves a noun or adjective (an item with N dominant over P), but this is not crucial to the present discussion. The ‘subject’ of the adjective shares its argument (via ‘raising’) with the free abs associated with the copula.

The minimum categorisation for *aftos* and *ekinos* is, accordingly, as in (68):

(68) \[ \{N\{def}/\} \]

That is, they seek a definite transitive (‘/’) determinative to depend on, with a resulting structure as illustrated in (69):

(69) \[ \{N\{def}/\} \]

‘{N;P}’ is here interpreted as the default complement for {N}. (We return below, however, to a more careful consideration of the nature of the complementation of the definite article, particularly in the light of observations already made in §1.)

However, this proximal/distal pair of deictics, as with English *this* and *that*, and, indeed, quite generally with such elements (whether there are two or more of them), can also occur independently as pronouns, as intransitive determinatives:

(70) Ti ine afto/ekino;

what is this/that?

In this case they must share a categorisation with, for instance *to* (in Greek), or *it* (in English), as {N}. But clearly *this* and *that* and the like are categorially distinct from *it* and its equivalents, and from each other. Apart from anything else, they can also be used as specifiers of ‘{N\{det}\}’ (in Greek) or transitively (in English). I suggest that what distinguishes demonstratives from *it* and other personal pronouns is the property that ensures that *this* and *that* enable primary identification, viz. the deixis which is the basis for one way of naming them (cf. Jespersen’s (1933: §16.2) ‘pronouns of pointing’). Deixis in their case, in its prototypical form, involves a paralinguistic gesture combined with a signalling of orientation with respect to the speech participants, particularly the speaker. We might then suggest at least the components in (71) as the respective categorisations for these deictic pronouns, in whatever language:
This and that orient an entity with respect to a speech act participant, typically as located in the environs of the speaker (or some metaphorical extension thereof) in the case of the former (the semantic relation \(\{\text{loc}\} = \text{at, to}\)), as not located in these environs in the case of the latter (the semantic relation \(\{\text{abl(ative)}\} = \text{not-at, from}\)). Languages vary in the extent to which the members of such pairs insist on proximality/distality, so that, for instance, pronominal English this and Greek aftos are not strictly translationally equivalent.

In English, the demonstrative determiners will differ from the demonstrative pronouns in their categorisation merely in being transitive: \(\{N\{\text{def}\}/\}\). In Greek definiteness is expressed separately, as we have seen; so that we might represent the non-pronominal demonstratives as the expansions of (68) given in (72):

\[
\begin{align*}
(72) \ a. & \ \{\text{loc}\}\{N\{\text{def}\}/\} \\
& \ \{N\{\text{ego}\}\} \\
\ b. & \ \{\text{abl}\}\{N\{\text{def}\}/\} \\
& \ \{N\{\text{ego}\}\}
\end{align*}
\]

That is, in Greek the non-pronominal demonstratives are specifiers of the definite article, as embodied in (69), and they have an internal structure which identifies their referents with respect to proximity to the speech act participants. It is this orientation that enables the demonstratives to provide primary identification of arguments, as discussed in §1.1. This is the ‘something extra’ that distinguishes them from other merely definite determination. In §1.1 we found that names also have ‘something extra’ that secures primary identification. With the Greek non-pronominal demonstratives their ‘something extra’ is expressed distinctly from definiteness (as expressed in (72)); in English and in the Greek pronominal use the representation incorporates definiteness. Let us now try to arrive at a representation for the ‘something’ that is correspondingly distinctive about names.

### 3.2.2 Vocatives
Names lack definiteness when used vocatively. This suggests that it might be instructive to start with a consideration of the vocative use of names, considered briefly in §1.1. The syntax of vocatives suggests that they fulfil a function distinct from other functor phrases. Thus, as Jespersen observes, “the vocative … may be said to indicate that a noun is used as a second person and placed outside a sentence, or as a sentence in itself” (1924: 184). And Davies (1986: §5.3), for example, illustrates in some detail the distinctive distributional properties of vocatives in English, particularly as compared to imperative subjects. In (2.b), where the vocative is, in Jespersen’s terms, placed ‘outside the sentence’, we seem to have a use of a functor phrase as a non-participant in the predication, and not even as an adjunct (circumstantial) to the basic predication, but as some kind of ‘sentence modifier’:

\[
\begin{align*}
(2) \ a. & \ \text{Basil!} \\
\ b. & \ \text{I read that, Basil}
\end{align*}
\]
I interpret such vocatives as a distinct kind of functor phrase, with ‘voc(ative)’ as a distinct kind of semantic relation (from abl, erg, loc, abl), which, like other ‘sentence modifiers’ (such as, on one use, 
frankly – as in I dislike that, frankly), seeks a finiteness element as a head, as shown in (73.a), associated with a syntactic structure such as (b):

(73) a. \{voc\}\{P\}

b. 
{P} \\
| \\
\{P\} \{voc\}\{P\} \\
| \\
\{abs\} \{P;N/\{abs\}\{erg\}\} \{N\} \\
| | \\
\{erg\} \{abs\} \\
| \\
\{N\} \{N\} \\
| \\
I read that Basil

As a functor, \{voc\}, like \{abs\} etc., is automatically complemented by an argument, here the \{N\} realised as Basil; and by virtue of its further specification it introduces a node of the same category as \{P\} above the \{P\} associated with read. Names, as non-predicators, do not include a \{N;P\} specification such as is associated with nouns.

Unfortunately, the vocative among semantic functions has suffered the same neglect as names among word classes; but some of their syntax is clear. Jespersen’s term ‘outside the sentence’, for instance, involves a range of linear positions such as are characteristic of ‘sentence modifiers’, including those in (74):

(74) a. Basil, I read that

b. I too, Basil, read that

‘Sentence modifiers’ share with specifiers the relationship to a particular category embodied in the back-slash notation; but they are not closed-class or distinctive of the category they modify (so that e.g. many \{P\}-modifiers, such as frankly, also modify \{P;N\}). The distinction is also reflected in the different word order possibilities (cf. Anderson 1997: §2.8). Interpretation of ‘vocative’ as a functor subcategory is, of course, consistent with the signalling of ‘vocative’ in various inflectional languages by members of the declensional paradigm which are in commutation with ‘cases’ expressing such distinctions as \{abs\} vs. \{erg\} vs. \{loc\} vs. \{abl\} or neutralisations of these (nominative, accusative etc.). The Greek vocative in (7.d) (again repeated here) is paradigmatically related to the nominative and accusative in (a):

(7) c. Onomazete Vasilis/Ton lene Vasili
   he-is-called Basil/Him they-call Basil

d. Vassili!

In this paradigm the vocative syncretises with the accusative; but compare filos/filo/filu/file ‘friend’, nominative/accusative/genitive/vocative – i.e. with distinctive vocative.

(2.a), repeated above, illustrates that vocatives also occur as complete utterances. And they need not be interpreted as truncated predications: they constitute a complete predication. Compare Sweet: ‘The vocative … is a noun used as a sentence-word; we might therefore call it the “sentence-case”’ (1891: 50). Such a predication we might represent as in (75.a), fed by the lexical redundancy formulated in (b):
(75) a. \{P\} \\
| \{\{voc\}\} \\
| \{N\} 

b. \{P\} \\
| \{\{voc\}\} \Rightarrow \{\{voc\}\} 

c. \{\{voc\}\} \Rightarrow \{\{voc\}\{P\}\} 

d. \{\{voc\}\} = \{\{P\}\} 

(75.c) gives the alternative redundancy for ‘\{\{voc\}\}’ which underlies the representation in (73.a). On other such ‘sentential particles’, such as yes and no, see Anderson in press: §2.

There are problems with the acceptance of such a semantic relation as ‘\{voc\}’, however. Roger Böhm (veranda communication) has reminded me that the reluctance, particularly among localists, to include vocative with other manifestations of ‘case’ follows from the conclusion that ‘il semble en effet impossible de trouver une parenté de signification entre le vocatif et les cas, en grec aussi bien que qu’en toute autre langue’ given by Hjelmslev in discussing the case theory of Dionysius Thrax, to which he traces the ‘innovation choquant qui consiste à enrichir l’effectif casuel par le vocatif’ (1935: 4). Thus far in this discussion I have deployed four secondary functor categories which embody the localist analysis assumed in Anderson (1997) and argued for extensively elsewhere (see e.g. Anderson 1971, 1977). The internal structure of these secondary categories is displayed in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>secondary functor categories</th>
<th>abs</th>
<th>erg</th>
<th>loc</th>
<th>abl</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>composition</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>place</td>
<td>place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>source</td>
<td></td>
<td>source</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: The composition of the secondary functor categories

The four secondary functor categories are analysed in terms of presence/absence of two features with an obvious spatial interpretation: ‘loc’ is a place, ‘abl’ is a place which is also a source, ‘erg’ is a source which is not a place, and ‘abs’ is neither. There is no obvious place for ‘voc’ in such a system.

Vocatives also, as described in this subsection, and unlike the (other) functor subcategories, are not normally subcategorised for: they either are ‘sentence modifiers’ or they form part of a word. This suggests that vocative differs from the (other) uses of functors in indeed lacking the secondary categories which enter into subcategorisation. (This is a suggestion emanating from Roger Böhm, who is not responsible, of course, for what I have made of it.) Vocative is a functor lacking a secondary category. We can indeed define vocative as an unspecified (for secondary category) functor that requires a finiteness category to modify, as in (75.d). This enables us to retain expression of its relational character (it is a functor) but avoids dilution of our notion of the content of functors. Its distinctiveness consists in being an unspecified functor that is attached to ‘\{P\}’, which is a category modified by speech act elaborators (frankly etc.): the unmarked functor phrase elaborates on the identity of the addressee.

Note too that adoption of (75.d) enables us to dispense with (75.b) and (c). As a functional category, ‘\{P\}’ may take ‘\{\{voc\}\}’ (i.e. ‘\{\{P\}\}\{voc\}\}’) in subjunction, as in (75.a), or adjoined, as in (73.b); either configuration fulfils the definition of ‘\{\{voc\}\}’.

3.2.3 Nomination predicates Non-definite names also apparently occur in languages as participant arguments, as complements, with a small set of verbs that are subcategorised for taking an element that can elsewhere be a vocative. This is illustrated by (7.c) for Greek, repeated above, and (7a-b) for English:

(7) a. I name this child Basil 
   b. That one/Their youngest child is called Basil
Say we interpret such verbs as indeed being, untypically, subcategorised for the unspecified functor, which otherwise does not figure in subcategorisation. That a distinctive functor is involved both here and in the traditional vocative illustrated by (2) and (74) is confirmed by the common, and potentially unlimited, range of complements the functor can take:

(76) a. Hester called me Attila/idiot/this/beautiful/loathe/very/(belch)/(beginning of Beethoven’s 5th)/…
   b. I read that, Basil/this/beautiful/loathe/very/(belch)/(beginning of Beethoven’s 5th)/…

This is in accord with the functors unspecified character, in itself demanding nothing of its argument. Compare the ‘{{erg}}’ functor, which prefers humanoid complements, arguments to whose referents can be attributed human characteristics (sentience, volition, purpose, …); and the ‘place’ functors invite arguments that can be conceived of in locational terms. Vocatives are restricted, to be sure, by their speech act function, by their attachment to ‘{{P}}’: they are usually addressed to humans (even if only metaphorically so), however bizarrely we choose to name them. The unspecified functor associated with naming verbs is not so restricted; in their case the unspecified functor does not seek to modify ‘{{P}}’.

As a first approximation, we might then represent the structure of such sentences as (7.a) as in (77):

(77) {P}

Again the upper ‘{{abs}}’ is the free functor associated with raising/subject-formation; and the verb is subcategorised for the three functors shown.

Let us now observe, however, that (77) involves a lexical causative verb, which is internally complex in the way shown in (78), with the consequences for syntactic structure also shown there:

(78) {P}

(cf. e.g. Anderson 1971: §11.3; 1977: §2.7; forthcoming). The ‘{{erg,loc}}’ argument of the lower ‘{{P;N}}’ here is the ‘recipient’ of the name; the ‘{{abs}}’ of the upper ‘{{P;N}}’ is another free abs, which via raising shares its argument with the lower argument highest on the subject selection hierarchy. This ‘{{abs}}’ is outranked as subject in its own clause by the ‘{{erg}}’, which latter thus shares its argument with the higher free abs.

If we now compare (78) with the structure associated with a canonical lexical causative such as that in (79) (cf. particularly Anderson forthcoming), however, it is clear that ‘{}’ here occupies a position where we would expect a ‘{{abs}}’:
We can implement this observation structurally by taking the ‘{    }’ phrase in (78) as being in apposition with an incorporated ‘{{abs}}’. Let us look firstly at what is involved in incorporation.

The pair in (80) illustrates lack of and presence of incorporation:

(80) a. We gave Fred our thanks
    b. We thanked Fred

In (80.b) we have a derived verb that incorporates the equivalent of the ‘{{abs}}’ argument that is expressed overtly in (a), and the derived verb reflects in its expression the shape of the incorporated argument. In some languages the ‘recipient’ argument in transitive structures such as (80.b) may retain the morphological marking it would have in non-incorporated ditransitives like (80.a), as in the Old English of (81.b):

(81) a. He Gode þancas dyde
    he God-dat thanks made
    b. He Gode þancode
    he God-dat thanked

Compare the morphosyntax of (81.b) with that associated with the verb without incorporation of (a). Thus, whereas we can associate a structure such as (79) with (80.a) and (81.a), the (b) examples involve a derived verb which induces the structure in (82):

(82) {P}

{abs} {P:N/{erg}}

{erg} {P:N/{erg,loc},{abs}} {abs}

{N} : {erg,loc} {abs}

: : {N} {N}

: : : :

Hester gave me those

we thanked Fred

The ‘{abs}’ valency of the lower predicator in the verb complex is satisfied internally.

We have a similar unincorporated and incorporated pair in the name-giving predications of (83):

(83) a. We gave her the name (of) Ermintrude
    b. We named her Ermintrude

But in this case there is an unincorporated residue (Ermintrude) in the incorporating version (83.b). This gives us a clue as to the role of the name in such structures.

I suggest (84) as an indication of the structure of (83.a):
We have a standard ditransitive, except that the subordinate ‘{{abs}}’ argument contains an appositive. It is, moreover, an appositive to an element that itself is not in these circumstances fully identificatory, the name; the appositive is essential for identification.

The syntax and semantics of apposition is not well understood, and the structure proposed in (84) remains tentative. ‘Apposition’ has been used to cover a range of possibilities, not necessarily syntactically homogeneous. But I suggest that (84) does not violate a basic understanding of what is involved in ‘apposition’. It does at least give some motivation for the presence of a definite article which is not even non-specifically identificatory. (85.a) also contains an appositive, but in its case the apposed-to element provides at least non-specific identification and the appositive is more obviously omissible.

(85) a. We then met the butcher, Mary’s uncle
    b. He came to the city *(of) Birmingham

We have two sources of identification, and we have paratactic syntax. The appositive in (85.b), on the other hand, is non-paratactic and is, if anything, even more closely integrated than in (83.a) with the apposed-to element: notice the non-omissibility of the overt functor. And the city is even less specifically identificatory.

As a non-paratactic appositive, the vocative phrase in (84) introduces a ‘{N}’ node above the ‘{N|{N{prt}}}’ realised ultimately as the. This latter characterisation elaborates on the structure for the that we have assumed so far. The is a determinative that is not just transitive (recall (69) above) but takes specifically another determinative as a complement, a partitive one. ‘P(a)rt(ii)ve’ is a final semantic relation, which the {N} which complements the is subcategorised for; this is the default complementation of the. Normally the is definite (the speaker believes that the addressee is able to identify the referent), as indicated in (69). But here the appositive conveys the identity of the referent, so that the does not have the definiteness property in this case. An attributive, such as that in We gave her the ancient name Ermintrude, attaches to the basic ‘{N|{prt}}’ which governs ‘{prt}’; it labels the subset introduced by ‘{N|{prt}}’. Each attributive in a stack such as that realised in the little-used ancient name is associated with a ‘{N|{prt}}- {prt}’ sequence. More on definite articles and attributives in a moment.

I note in passing that ‘{prt}’ as a secondary functor category is compatible with the characterisation of the content of the functor category given in Table 3, in so far as I take it to be in complementary distribution with ‘{erg}’, as indicated in Table 3*.
Both ‘{erg}’ and ‘{prt}’ are non-place sources: ‘{erg}’, the source of the event, enters into the subcategorisation of verbal; ‘{prt}’, marking an entity as source, enters into the subcategorisation of nominals, such as the definite article (recall (84)) and ‘relational nouns’ such as group, set, drop etc. (This assumes that the only nouns that ‘{erg}’ subcategorises are derived from verbs, and that ‘partitive’ subjects and objects (as attributed to e.g. Finnish) do not in this respect reflect the functor subcategorisation of the verb. This again lies outside the scope of the present discussion. See further Anderson 1997: §3.7.)

(83.a), then, is a causative with a ‘{abs}’ argument containing an appositive structure, as represented in (84). (83.b), on the other hand, involves a derived verb with an incorporated functor phrase; the ‘{ }’ is apposed to the predicator ‘{P;N}’, in the syntax of whose clause it participates and whose incorporated argument it makes explicit. I represent this as (86.a):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(86.a)} &. & \{\text{P}\} \\
& & \{\text{P;N}\}/\{\text{erg}\} \\
& & \{\text{abs}\} \\
& & \{\text{P;N}\} \\
& & \{\text{erg,loc}\}, \{\text{abs}\} \\
& & \{\text{abs}\} \\
& & \{\text{erg,loc}\} \\
& & \{\text{N}\} \\
& & \{\text{N;P}\} \\
& & \{\text{N}\} \\
& & \{\text{N;P}\} \\
& & \text{we named her Ermintrude}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(86.b)} &. & \{\text{P;N}/\{\text{erg,loc}\}, \{\text{abs}\}\} & \equiv & \{\text{abs}\} \\
& & \{\text{P;N}\} & \rightarrow & \{\text{P;N}\}/\{\text{erg,loc}\} \\
& & \{\text{N;P}\} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(86.c)} &. & \{\text{P;N}/\{\text{erg,loc}\}\} \\
& & \{\text{abs}\} \\
& & \{\text{N;P}\}
\end{align*}
\]

(86.b) gives an outline derivational rule. I have abbreviated the specification of the category that the Ermintrude element seeks to modify as ‘{N;P…}’; it seeks indeed a rather specific head, namely that given in (86.c), which reflects the outcome of (b).

In many languages the non-participant, or adjunct status of the name in (83.b/86.a) is reflected in the corresponding questions, as e.g. in Greek (87.a) and (b):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(87.a)} &. & \text{Pos onomazete;} \\
& & \text{how s/he/it-is-called?} \\
& & \text{‘What is s/he/it called?’} \\
\text{(87.b)} &. & \text{Pos ton lene;} \\
& & \text{how him they call?} \\
& & \text{‘What do they call him?’}
\end{align*}
\]
c. Ti thakena ona o ogíg;
   what fut do now the driver?
   ('What will the driver do now?')

d. Ti ton kanane; (Ton kanane grammatgea.)
   what him they-made? (him they-made secretary.)
   ('What did they make him? (They made him secretary.)

Compare the questioning of a participant and a predicate in (87.c) and (d) respectively. English is more ambivalent, in that what is used as the question word in the glosses throughout (87). And How did they name their child? is rather formal and archaic. However that may be, such a characterisation is rather different from what seems to be appropriate to sentences with 'standard object-predicatives' such as They made him a/the scapegoat, with which nomination constructions are often grouped.

In both instances involving naming constructions – (84) and (86) – the '{ }' phrase is again, after all, a non-participant, as in (73). It is a modifier of '{N/{N/prt}}' (84) or of '{P:N}' (86) or of '{P}' (73). The final alternative for the unspecified functor is as a 'sentence-word', as in (2.a) or (7.d), as shown in (75.a). We can thus add to the characterisations in (75.a/d) the circumstances specified in (86.c) and (88.a) as indications of where the unspecified functor may appear. (88) brings together these various characterisations of the role of the unspecified functor:

(88) a. { \{N/{N\{prt\}}\}
   b. { \{P;N/{erg,loc}\} (= (86.c))
       \{abs\}
       \{N;P\}
   c. { \{P\} (= (75.d))
   d. \{P\} (= (75.a))
       \}
       \}
       \{N\}

The unspecified functor is not a complement, and its argument is non-definite: it is neither definite nor indefinite. We return to these notions in §3.2.5.

(88.c) and (d) are specifically vocative; in them the addressee is identified; such vocatives are marked with a vocative inflexion in languages which distinguish such a case. Given this, you in English may occur as the argument of such an unspecified functor, as, of course, can names, but no other determinatives (except of the Close the door, someone variety). Reluctance by some grammarians to recognise the vocative as a ‘case’ like the others is not surprising, even laying aside the localist motivations discussed above (in §3.2.2). Unlike the other ‘cases’ it is not subcategorised-for: it is either an apposed modifier of '{P}' (88.c) or it is part of a derived item, a ‘sentence-word’ (88.d). As Hjelmslev (1935: 22) comments on the case theory of the Roman grammarians, ‘le vocatif figure toujours comme le casus quintus, et c’est lui seul qui peut être défini par le caractère d’indépendance: quintus non regitur’. But, I have suggested, it is nevertheless interpretable as a functor. The other functors are basically spatial (‘localist’); the vocative is unspecified for the localist distinctions, and is interpreted with respect to the speech act, as the addressee.

The unspecified functor of (88.a/b) introduces a name, institutionalised or nonce, thus excluding you under its normal interpretation. The (88.b) use too is associated in some languages with another awkward ‘case’. In Hungarian, as we have seen (in the introduction to §1), the '{ }' in structures associated with (88.b) – such as the equivalents of (86) – is marked by a special affix, as in (1.a):

(1) a. Én Ferinek fogom hívni
    I Frank I-shall call (him)
   b. Ezt szépnek mondják
    this beautiful they-call
However, (1.b) recalls to us that the affix is also associated with acts of ‘calling’ that are not necessarily acts of ‘naming’ in the strict sense. Unsurprisingly, in Greek names which are apposed to a nominal, as in (88.a), as well as those apposed to the verb (88.b), lack the definite article associated with argument use of a name: Klístē mas ēnâ diklîno sto ṓnoma Angelopúlos ‘Reserve us a room in the name Angelopolós’.

We can characterise names as non-deictic[N]s which inherently complement the unspecified functor and no other functor; they require to be made definite to complement the other functors, to constitute arguments, as made overt in the syntax of e.g. Greek, and as we shall discuss further in §3.2.4. Names undergo the lexical redundancy formulated in (89.a), which permits them only the unspecified functor:

\[
(89) \begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \{\ast\{\}\} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \{\{\text{voc}\}\} (= \{\backslash\{\text{P}\}\}) \\
\text{c.} & \quad \{\{\text{voc}\}\} \Rightarrow \{\{\text{voc}\}\} = \text{tu} \\
& \quad \{\text{N}[\text{cnt}]\}
\end{align*}
\]

I take it, too, that second-persons are lexically as in (89.b) (where ‘{\{\text{voc}\}\}’ is a cover term only) as potentially the ‘{N}’ of the addressee, which ‘{N}’ they acquire via redundancy (89.c), thus also satisfying the requirement that a functor must, other things being equal, govern a ‘{N}’. This ‘{N}’ is further marked as ‘{cnt}’, given that the second person shows a number contrast. (Such is not a novel proposal: see e.g. Thorne 1966.) Other uses of the second person pronoun are derivative of (89.c).

Names are less closely tied to vocativity, but (89.a) gives them a privileged position as such. An intimate relationship between name and vocative is suggested by such historical developments as the accent realignment in Ancient Greek discussed by Kuryłowicz (1966). He observes that whereas with nouns the non-final accentuation of the Indo-European vocative is eliminated in favour of the final accentuation predominant elsewhere in the paradigm, with names it is the accentuation of the vocative that is generalised: thus karpós ‘fruit’ vs. Kárpos, name. He concludes: ‘l’accentuation récessive des noms propres continue donc, de manière indirecte, l’accentuation du vocatif indo-européen, abandonnée en grec historique’ (Kuryłowicz 1966: 365). Such a relationship with vocatives is fairly transparent with personal names; but all other names are only figurative addressees, potentially apostrophic, or institutionalisations of such a use. In some circumstances and in some linguistic cultures such extensions may well be appropriate. On the other hand, even with personal names, usage involving vocative names may be restricted in particular languages: use of names for address may have to be accompanied by signals of relative status or even avoided by certain groups of speakers.

### 3.2.4 Definite names and partitivity

So far here we have been considering non-definite names. When names are definite in languages like English, they have rather the structure embodied in (90):

\[
(90) \quad \{\text{N}\{\text{def}\}\}
\]

(To simplify the presentation, I have omitted from (90) the specification of the subcategorisation of ‘{N{def}}’ as ‘/{N}\’. This will be henceforth my general policy with regard to subcategorisations that are satisfied ‘internally’, as in (90).) So represented, a name can function as either a participant or circumstantial argument, and crucially as the normal participant illustrated by (3.a), as opposed to (2):

\[
(3) \begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{I don’t like Basil} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{I don’t like that}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
(2) \begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{Basil!} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{I read that, Basil}
\end{align*}
\]

Names are thus subject in English to the alternative (to (89.a)) redundancy in (91):
(91) \[ \{N\{\text{def}}\} \]
\[ \Rightarrow \{N\} \]

(91) introduces another syntactic possibility for names, by allowing for a derived form in which ‘\{N\{def\}\}’ appears instead of ‘\{\}’. In Greek, names not in overt vocative use (or in nominations) do not undergo (91); rather, as parts of arguments Greek names complement the definite article. This correlates with an important difference between the definite article in English and that in Greek, one which emerges from pursuit of the discussion in §1.

The English definite article is highly partitive: it is almost always understood as introducing a subset of the set denoted by the term which complements it. Thus, we can associate with the second girl-phrase in (11.a), for example, a representation such as:

\[
(92) \{N\{\text{def,sg}}/{N/\{\text{prt}\}}\}
\]

As observed above, the \{N\} which complements ‘\{N\{def\}\}’ is subcategorised for ‘\{\{\text{prt}\}\}’; and this is the default complementation of the. Unlike other functors, ‘\{\{\text{prt}\}\}’ can be complemented by ‘\{N;P\}’ (as here) as well as ‘\{N\}’. ‘\{sg\}’ is attached to the highest ‘\{N\}’ in a chain, just as tense in English is realised on the highest verbal (but see §3.2.5, however, where the ‘\{N/\{\text{prt}\}\}-\{\text{prt}\}-\{N;P\}’ complex will also be discussed further).

Often the subset involved will have a descriptive modifier (whose internal structure is simplified here – and whose analysis here differs from that in Anderson 1997):

\[
(93) \{N\{\text{def}}/{N/\{\text{prt}\}}\}
\]

The attributive is interpreted as a \{N/\{\text{prt}\}\}-modifier, and introduces a higher ‘\{N\}’ node transparent to the subcategorisation requirements of the definite article. Intransitive modifiers of course precede the noun, as in the white girl.

Partitive-\{N\} complementation is an almost exceptionless default with ‘\{N\{def\}\}’ in English. The only obvious singular exceptions are collective generics like (21.b), and some names (the Thames etc.), which apparently have the as part of their lexical structure:

(21) a. The lion has four legs and a tail
    b. The lion is extinct

Plural names also take a the, systematically. Other definite plurals, and definite uncountables, even non-specifics, are insistently partitive, so that we find the judgements recorded in (23) with respect to generic interpretations:

(23)a. I don’t like the lions *(in zoos)
b. The lions *(in zoos)* are pathetic

We can thus sum up the default syntax of *the* in English as in the categorial representation of (94), which demands for it a partitive determinative complement:

(94) \{N{def}/[N/{prt}]\}

But singulars like (21.b) and some singular and all plural names represent exceptions. I suggest, indeed, that the singulative in (21.a) is also non-partitive, if generic; and I shall return to the characterisation of the singulative/collective distinction when we take up indefinites in §3.2.5. We can formulate the exceptionality with singulars in terms of the optional redundancy in (95), so that, when complemented by a singular, the definite article doesn’t require that complement to be partitive:

(95) \{def}/[N{sg}/[prt]] \Rightarrow \{def}/[N{sg}]

And if we assume that plural names in English, like *the Smiths*, are not subject to (91), as if they were Greek names, then we can say that the definite article can take a plural non-partitive only if the latter is a name.

On the other hand, definite articles to which are apposed non-paratactic appositives are exceptional in another respect, in not being identificatory, as we saw in relation to (84); but I do not pursue this here.

As we have seen (in §§1.3-.4), the Greek and French definite articles are very generally only optionally partitive; they are necessarily partitive only if specific. Recall (24) and (28.b-c), which, on one interpretation, at least, contain plural and uncountable non-partitive non-specifics:

(24) a. Fovate ta skila
    s/he-is-frightened-of the dogs
b. Les lions sont dangéreux
    the lions are dangerous

(28) b. Fovate to thanato
    s/he-is-frightened-of the death
c. L’art embellit la vie
    the art embellishes the life

This means that we can represent the definite article in these languages as in (96), which does not restrict the article to partitive complements:

(96) \{N{def}/[N]\}

And the exception can be formulated as in (97), which applies obligatorily:

(97) \{def}/[N{spec}]/\{def}/[N{spec}]/[prt] \Rightarrow \{def}/[N{spec}/[prt]}

Only definite articles that are complemented by a specific ‘{N}’ require that ‘{N}’ to be partitive. (24) and (28) may be either specific partitives or non-specific and either partitive or not. Non-specific non-partitives are generic.

Now, unlike in French and English, Greek names do not undergo redundancy (91), which gives a derived name that is definite, represented as in (90), repeated here:

(90) \{N{def}\}

\[|\]
\{N\}

But since in Greek (as in French) the definite article does not require that its complement be partitive, as represented in (96), names in Greek can simply complement the definite article when used as definite arguments rather than vocatively, given their inherent specification as ‘{N}’. They achieve definiteness periphrastically.
3.2.5 Indefinites and generics  Indefinites have not been our main concern here, given the focus of
attention on names, which are either definite or non-definite. Names are non-definite when they are
used as overt vocatives or as part of nomination constructions, as discussed in §§1.3 & 3.2.3. It is
important to distinguish the non-definiteness of such uses from (positive) indefiniteness, which
involves presence of a particular property rather than, as in the case of non-definiteness, simply
absence of definiteness; and I therefore want to be a little more explicit here about the representation
of indefiniteness.

As suggested in §1.2, the role of indefinites is to introduce partitivity, whether (as a subclass
of a functional category) the indefinite is realised as a distinct word, as in (11) and (12), with an
indefinite article, or whether it is incorporated as part of the representation, and thus realisation, of a
non-functional category, as with the (plural/mass) subject nouns in (15.a-b) and the (plural and mass)
objects in (c-d):

(11) a. A boy and a girl came to see Jill. The girl knows Jack
   b. There were a boy and a girl came to see Jill

(12) a. I eat an orange at breakfast
   b. Bill longs for a yacht

(15) a. Men came towards me
   b. Water fell on me
   c. I’ll hire painters
   d. I want wine

Compare the overt indefinites in (98):

(98) a. Some men came towards me
   b. Some water fell on me
   c. I’ll hire some painters
   d. I want some wine

I am suggesting that an indefinite element is involved in both types of nominal construction (whose
incidence varies from language to language). The incorporation construction can be represented as in
(99):

(99) a. {N/{prt}}
   | |
   {{prt}}
   | |
   {N;P{cnt}}
   : :
men

b. {N/{prt}}
   | |
   {{prt}}
   | |
   {N;P}
   : :
water

The periphrastic is illustrated by (100):
a. \{N/{prt}\}
   \|-- \{prt\}
   |    \|-- \{N;P\{cnt\}\}
   |         \|-- \{\}
   |                     \|-- \{\}

   some men

b. \{N/{prt}\}
   \|-- \{prt\}
   |    \|-- \{N;P\}
   |         \|-- \{\}
   |                     \|-- \{\}

   some water

c. \{N{sg}/{prt}\}
   \|-- \{prt\}
   |    \|-- \{N;P\{cnt\}\}
   |         \|-- \{\}
   |                     \|-- \{\}

   a girl

\'C(ou)nt\', a property of the noun, \'{N;P}\}', is realised as a plural inflexion unless overridden by an overt singular superordinate \'{N/{prt}}\}', as in (100.c); and \'{sg}\}', a property of \'{N}\}', must have a dependent partitive that is \'{cnt}\}'.

The representations in (99) are allowed for by the redundancy in (101), which builds complexes of noun and determinatives:

(101) \{N\{prt\}\}
    \|-- \{prt\}
    |    \|-- \{N;P\} \Rightarrow \{N;P\}

This allows any noun to constitute a partitive argument, and thus satisfy the valency of functors. It allows for plurals and uncountables to act in this way; but it does not allow for singular arguments to consist only of nouns, but requires presence of an overt determinative: notice that, crucially, \'{sg}\}' is missing from what is added by (101); English does not have a non-periphrastic singular partitive marker. Likewise, definiteness in English (singular or not) needs to be expressed via an overt determinative.

The redundancy in (101) is lacking in French, and there argument nouns are in general accompanied by an overt determinative, as illustrated by (25), repeated here:

(25) a. Georges a acheté *(des/les) timbres
    George (has) bought (some/the) stamps

b. Georges a acheté *(du/le) sucre
    George (has) bought (some/the) sugar

Recall §1.3. In other languages still, such as Polish, the equivalent of (101) allows for complexes including (indefinite) singularity and definiteness. Thus, single nouns occur in place of (92) and (100): these languages are said to lack articles. In some such languages definiteness may be marked morphologically, but in others definite vs. indefinite readings may have to be interpreted from the context, including syntactic position (cf. e.g. Szwedek 1974).

In all the representations in (99)-(100) the indefinite may be either specific or non-specific. Fully generic constructions involve non-specific nominals with at most a limited scope for partitivity.
I proposed indeed that definite generics are both non-specific and non-partitive, with partitivity (and reduced genericness) forced by presence of attributives, as in (23). Let us now look at the indefinites in this respect. I suggest that in English generic plurals and uncountables not only cannot have a definite article but are non-partitive. Thus, strictly, in terms of the distinction drawn initially in this subsection, they are non-definite rather than indefinite. Consider firstly representation of the collective in (18.b):

(18) a. Lions have four legs and a tail
    b. Lions are extinct

It might seem that as a collective generic the subject of (18.b) might be represented simply as in, say, (102.a):

(102)a. \{'N;P{cnt}\}
    :  
    lions

b. \{'N;P\}
    :  
    water

(102.b) seems to be sufficient for the mass term. These representations lack a governing '{N}', however. '{N;P}' can function as an argument, as the complement of functors other than '{prt}', only via a '{N}': these functors must ordinarily be complemented by '{N}' (if we ignore verbal complements – Anderson 1997: §3.6). This would seem not to be the case in (18.b) if the subject functor were to be complemented by simply the structure in (102.a).

I assume therefore that there applies in English, and in other languages and circumstances where such an ill-formed argument as those in (102) would arise, a further, regularising, syntactic redundancy which ensures that a default '{N}' intervenes between a functor and '{N;P}':

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\{{\negprt}\} \quad \{{\negprt}\} \\
\Rightarrow \quad \{N\} \\
\{N;P\} \quad \{N;P\}
\end{array}
\]

(cf. Anderson 1997: §3.7.2). This redundancy, applying unless the functor is '{prt}', enables such predicators to complement a functor, even in the absence of a definite or indefinite determinative or of the application of (101).

The representation of generic uncountables is thus of a simplicity comparable with those for arguments consisting only of determinatives, including names. Indeed, if we interpret the '{N}' introduced by (103) to govern the '{N;P}' associated with water (and lions) as inherently definite – as suggested by comparable phenomena in French and Greek, for instance (recall (24/28)) – then the representations for generic abstracts and argumental names are very similar, as to some extent anticipated in §1.4.

All the other representations so far in this subsection can be specific or non-specific; and we can associate this with partitivity: specificity presupposes partitivity, or, in other terms, indefinites rather than non-definites. Presence of '{N;P}' (inherently predicative) introduces non-specificity. This is why (non-predicable) pronouns and names are necessarily specific (except for those non-deictic pronouns which have non-definite antecedents (recall (14)) or no antecedents (10) – but even they are in a sense specific to a particular context). Otherwise, it is only when partitivity is introduced that specificity is possible. Specificness I do not analyse further here. (On specificity and indefiniteness cf. e.g. Anderson 1997: §3.7.2.)

(102) lack partitive components and so cannot be specific. This is likewise the case with the singulative in (18.a), which differs in representation from (18.b) only in the presence of '{sg}', which signals that the predication is individually true of the members of the denoted set, without specifying any particular member, cf. (104.a) and (b):
Compare with (104.a) the representation in (104.c) for the partitive singulative object in I’ve sailed catamarans. Despite the presence of ‘sg’, count here and in (104.a) is realised as plural, in the absence of an overt ‘{N/{prt}}’ – cf. (101).

In Greek and French such a redundancy does not apply. Consequently non-definite plural and uncountable generics cannot emerge as arguments: plural generics and uncountables are definite, as illustrated by the object in (24.a) and the subject in (b), ambiguous between partitive and generic, but from which the definite article cannot be omitted on a generic reading:

\[(24) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{ Fovate ta skila} \\
& \text{s/he-is-frightened-of the dogs} \\
\text{b. } & \text{Les lions sont dangéreux} \\
& \text{the lions are dangerous}
\end{align*}\]

And French also lacks redundancy (101), making obligatory the presence of an overt determinative in arguments, given the requirement that functors other than ‘{{prt}}’ govern ‘{N}’.

The introduction in the preceding of the notion ‘singulative’ (in relation to (104)) raises the question of how this is to be represented in definite nominals, as opposed to the indefinites and non-definites which have been our concern here; and some attention given to that topic will indeed enable us to conclude some business left over from §3.2.4, as acknowledged in the discussion there of (21):

\[(21) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{The lion has four legs and a tail} \\
\text{b. } & \text{The lion is extinct}
\end{align*}\]

Return firstly to partitive (non-generic) singulatives.

The appropriate representation for the definite equivalent of (104.c) – the catamarans – would seem to be (105):
In (105), the singulative (as opposed to singular) ‘{sg}’ again does not inhibit expression of plurality, but, contrary to what was suggested in §3.2.4 (following the discussion of (92)), ‘{sg}’ is not attached to the highest ‘{N}’ in the chain. It is only the ‘{N}’ of true singularity that attaches to the highest ‘{N}’; the ‘{sg}’ marking singulatives specifies a ‘{N/{prt}}’ that is not realised as a distinct determinative (thus not that underlying a(n)). In §3.2.4 I compared the association of ‘{sg}’ with the highest ‘{N}’ in a chain with the attachment of tense to the highest verbal; here I note that the exceptionality of singulative ‘{sg}’ in possibly attaching to a ‘{N}’ that is not the highest, as in (105), is partially paralleled by the past tense reference of the perfect in English if the perfect construction involving have in, say, *Bill has left Vladivostock* is interpreted as involving a structure with a preterite subordinated to a non-preterite (as has been variously proposed – in e.g. McCawley 1971, Anderson 1976: ch.II).

The non-definite generic (104.a), the indefinite partitive (104.c) and the definite partitive (105) are all singulatives. And the singulative definite generic of (21.a) can thus be appropriately represented as in (106.a):

```
(106a)  \{N{def,s,g}/[N]\}
      \|   \{N{sg}/[prt]\}
      \|   \{[prt]\}
      \|   \{N;P[cont]\}
      \|   \{|\}
      \|   \{|\}
the    catamarans
```

Again, the singulative insists on the truth of the predication with respect to any, non-specific member of the set denoted. The collective in (21.b) lacks the singulative ‘{sg}’ in its representation, as shown in (106.b). This representation is very close to that for generic names given in (106.c). Generics, unlike other names, are lexically count nominals that incorporate a singular definite ‘{N}’. In (106.c), where both ‘{sg}’ and ‘{cnt}’ are attached to a ‘{N}’, no plural marker appears; contrast (104.a/c), with a ‘{N{sg}}’ incorporated into ‘{N;P}’.

In French, for example, the same singulative/collective distinction as we have been discussing applies to plural definite generics, and is characterisable in the same way. This variation – definite plural generics in French but non-definite in English – suggests that the definite/non-definite semantic
opposition is essentially neutralised in such circumstances, and the choice of definite expression or not is determined by other factors to do with the structure of the determinative system. The norm in French is for argument nouns to be accompanied by some form of determinative. In expression, French neutralises the expression of definite vs. generic; English that of indefinite vs. generic.

There remain as potential generics singular ‘indefinites’ corresponding to the non-generic non-names in the first sentence in (11.a) and in (11.b), repeated here again:

(11) a. A boy and a girl came to see Jill. The girl knows Jack
    b. There were a boy and a girl came to see Jill

In English such a generic is apparently represented by (16.a):

(16) a. A lion is a dangerous animal

Equivalents of this do not seem to be characteristic of Greek. Herschensohn (1977: 49) suggests that in French not only does the ‘generic’ indefinite article (which she associates with ‘subjective generics’) show ‘a more limited application than the definite article’ (which is to some extent true of English also), but also it ‘encourages the presence of discourse phenomena’, and she goes on (1977: 50) to associate ‘subjective generics’ with providing ‘an example to be generalized’, where ‘such an example exists as an instance related to one of the discourse participants’. (107.a) involves an ‘objective genitive’ and (b) a ‘subjective’:

(107)a. Le/*un brontosaure était un animal énorme
    ('The/*a brontosaurus was an enormous animal')
    b. Un brontosaure mangeait un arbre en dix minutes
    ('A brontosaurus could eat a tree in ten minutes')

I think these observations might relate to different syntactic preferences in different languages. Let’s look first of all at English.

The subject of (16.a) is apparently the singular equivalent of that in (16.b), on a singulative interpretation:

(16) b. Lions are dangerous animals

The singulative subject of (16.b) can be represented as in (104.a) above. (16.a) differs in showing an overt singular functor:

(108) {N{sg}/{N;P}}
    :
    :
    :
    : a lion

Again it differs from the non-generic in lacking partitivity, and thus, despite the presence of the article, in being non-definite rather than indefinite. (Recall too that ‘{sg}’ is not compatible with a ‘{N;P}’ that is not ‘{cnt}.’) As with the singular definite article, the indefinite is associated with a redundancy that allows non-partitivity. Recall again (95) for the singular definite article:

(95) {def}/{N{sg}/{prt}} ⇒ {def}/{N{sg}}

For the indefinite we have:

(109) {N{sg}/{prt}} ⇒ {N{sg}}

I suggest that languages vary in how acceptable they find (109), which renders the indefinite article not indefinite, and therefore in how widespread are singular indefinite. Herschensohn’s (1977) observations concerning French reflect residual partitivity in such non-specific sentences.

Burton-Roberts (1976, 1977) argues that a-generics carry no ‘referential presupposition’. They are not merely non-specific, but they instantiate a ‘metapredicative structure’: *A kangaroo is a
If that is so, these differences between languages concerning apparently indefinite singular generics may be related to the topic of the next paragraph. There is evidence in some languages that the requirement that '{N;P}' be governed by a '{N}' is even more general than suggested by the formulation in (103). In English, predicative as well as argument singular indefinites show an indefinite article, as in (51a):

(51) a. Peter is a doctor
b. Pierre est médecin
c. O Petros ine yatros

Compare the French and Greek equivalents in (b) and (c). I suggest that (51.a) reflects an extension to (103) such as is given in (110):

(110) \( \langle N \lor \neg \text{prt} \rangle \langle N \lor \neg \text{prt} \rangle \Rightarrow \langle N \rangle \langle N;P \rangle \langle N;P \rangle \)

(110) limits '{N;P}' to government by '{N}' or '{prt}'. The dependency lines in (110) may or may not be accompanied by linear difference: the copular verb in (51.a), for instance, precedes '{N;P}', and the '{N}' introduced when the '{N;P}' is countable and agrees with a singular subject will precede it in the shape of the indefinite article. Thus, the predicative '{N;P}' in (51.a) governed by the copular verb acquires an intervening indefinite article. Is this associated with the availability of 'metapredicative' a-generics?

Other languages are resistant to this extension to (103). Use of an indefinite article with predicative nouns tends to emphasise a subpart relation, thus partitivity, and presumably involves a normal partitive indefinite article rather than the result of (110). Holton et al. comment on Greek usage: ‘… the indefinite article may optionally accompany the predicate if the noun is made more specific in some way, e.g. by an adjective’ (1997: 283); and they offer the example in (111.a):

(111)a. In enas kalos kathiyitis
   he-is a good professor
b. Il est un artiste de mérite
   ('He is an artist of merit')
c. La rose est une fleur
   ('The rose is a (kind of) flower')
d. C’est une Flamande
   ('It/she is a Fleming')

(111.b) illustrates the same phenomenon in French. This is as to be expected, given that an attributive involves partitivity: recall the representation of the attributive in (93) above:

(93) \[ N \{\text{def}/[N/\{\text{prt}\} \}

\]

(111.c) likewise insists on the subpart relation, and partitivity. The post-copular nominal in (111.d) is equative, not predicative (Anderson 1997: 17-8). This means that, with these reservations (and with an acknowledgement of such lexicalised phrases as *J’ai faim* ‘I have hunger’, or *Je vous demande pardon* ‘I you ask pardon’), there is a clear
formal demarcation of argument and predicative nominals in French: the former are preceded by an overt determinative (including partitives), the latter not. Recall again (25) and the discussion in §1.3:

(25) a. Georges a acheté *(des/les) timbres
   George (has) bought (some/the) stamps
b. Georges a acheté *(du/le) sucre
   George (has) bought (some/the) sugar

We might include among the predicatives those attributive nouns traditionally described as showing ‘référence virtuel’ (cf. e.g. Brulard 1996 – which also exemplifies further some of the differences between French and English that I have been concerned with here), exemplified by the second noun in (112.a):

(112)a. les poissons de rivière
    the fishes of river
   (‘river fish’)

b. Il a été accusé de meurtre
   (‘He has been accused of murder’)
c. Il n’y a pas de beurre
   (‘There is no butter’)

Instances of ‘référence virtuel’ like the noun in (112.b) are less easily so interpreted. And, perhaps after all, all of (112) should be regarded as involving an article, in the way that (112.c) arguably does – in its case, a negative partitive article.

3.2.6 Naming names In the preceding I characterised names in terms of their rejection of specified functors in favour of the unspecified, as formulated in (89.a), repeated here:

(89) a. {*{   }}
\[ \{N\} \Rightarrow \{N\} = \text{name} \]

But though (89.a) represents an important characteristic of names, it emerges from the discussion in this section that they are already distinguished from other determinatives in other, even more basic ways. The essence of the name seems to be that it is a determinative, \{N\}, that is neither deictic nor definite nor indefinite (partitive) nor complement-taking. All other determinatives show one or more of these properties. Thus names are the simplest forms of \{N\}, bare \{N\}. They nevertheless allow primary identification, for which other elements depend on deixis. They are redundantly specific, and in many languages, such as English, may incorporate a definite article, via the redundancy in (91) – thus overcoming (89.a) and permitting names to serve as part of an argument:

(91) \{N{def}\}
\[ \{N\} \Rightarrow \{N\} \]

3.3 Derived names and name derivatives In this final section of §3 we are concerned with derived forms which are names or are derived forms based on names, not just for their own sake, which is enough to warrant discussion, but also for the light these throw on the representations proposed in the preceding sections, largely based on the semantics and (external) syntax of names. This is a vast topic, and the account given will be even more schematic than proposals in the rest of the present work, and it will be almost entirely based on English. Again, this in itself means that some relevant variables will not be considered in what follows, and there is obviously here no attempt at exhaustiveness, even in relation to English; but I think that the appropriateness of the general direction taken here is confirmed.

Consider plural names like the Smiths. They differ from core personal names in being plural and, like core names in Greek, in taking the definite article. The latter suggests that, as anticipated in
§3.2.4, and in the immediately preceding, such names have indeed not undergone (91). I suggest that this is triggered by the addition of ‘\{cnt\}’ to the core representation for Smith etc., as in (113):

\[(113) \quad \{N\{def\}/[N]\} \quad \{N\{cnt\}\} \quad \{N\} \quad \text{the Smiths} \]

The ‘\{N\{cnt\}\}’ has to complement a definite article in order to function as a definite argument. A similar suggestion could allow for items like the Hague, which, though singular, could be marked as exceptionally failing to undergo (91). However, in their case, the the seems to be part of the lexical representation, given the judgements recorded in (114):

\[(114) \quad \text{This town is called *(the) Hague} \]

The is present even when the name is non-definite. The Hague is then a phrasal name. We consider these in §3.3.2. Let us look now at other derived names based on non-application of (91).

Another possibility is the derivation of a collective/institutional name from a personal, as with, say, Ford. We might represent the derived form as in (115.a), and suggest the derivation in (b):

\[(115) \quad \text{a. } \{N\{def\}\{sg\}\} \quad \{N\{cnt\}\} \quad \{N\} \quad \text{Ford} \]

\[b. \quad \{N\{def\}\} \quad \{N\{cnt\}\} \quad \{N\} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \{N\} \]

Such a derived name may be singular or plural (Ford vs. Fords); here I have represented the more usual Ford, which as a lexical collective may take either singular or plural concord: Ford has/have ...

These derived names add to the set of names: a new collective name is formed from a personal name. I want to turn now to a derivational process that does not increase the set of names, one involving the attribution of partitivity to a name.

### 3.3.1 Partitive names

Names may be made partitive, to allow specification of an individual who in the context shares a name with others, either different individuals or alternative versions of itself, as exemplified by (40) and (41.b):

\[(40) \quad \text{a. the Bill with red hair} \quad \text{b. the young Byron, the France I’m fond of} \]

\[(41) \quad \text{b. We weren’t talking about the same Jones} \]

Each of these has an attributive which seeks a ‘\{N\{prt\}\}’ node to modify, and definiteness is carried by the definite article rather than being incorporated. This suggests a representation such as (116.a) for e.g. the young Byron:
Again, the derived name is based on the bare \{N\}, without application of (91). Its derivation involves a redundancy allowing partitivity to the name, as in (116.b). The Smith I used to know combines (a singular version of) (113) and (116), on one interpretation. (116.b) also underlies the type mentioned by e.g. Kuryłowicz (1966: 369): ‘quand je dis tous les Pierres célèbrent aujourd’hui la fête de leur patron, je parle d’un ensemble de personnes de sexe mâle qui n’ont rien en commun en dehors du nom’. Such involves a plural version of (113) combined with (116). Compare the singular in Il y a un William dans ma classe ‘There is a William in my class’ (Gary-Prieur 1994: 59).

We also find an independently expressed partitive ‘\{N\}’ in cases such as (117.a/b):

(117)a. A Mr Smith came to see you
   b. She got to know a Sir Jasper

The derived names in (117.a/b) have incorporate a ‘\{prt\}’, as formulated in (c), which allows them to complement the indefinite article. Availability of this derivational possibility seems to be particularly associated with names preceded by a title.

I have interpreted the titles in (117) as specifiers of the names which immediately follow them, and have omitted any indication of their specialisation with respect to particular sub-types of name (*Sir Smith etc.). The specifier system may be even more elaborate in other languages: cf. e.g. the complex ‘name pattern’ found among the Kadayans of northwest Borneo, as described by Maxwell (1984: 26-8). I do not pursue this here but turn instead to the internal structure of names themselves, and to further instances of derived names showing the failure of redundancy (91), followed by a return to phrasal names.

3.3.2 Name systems and the derivation of names The types of derived name noted in §3.3.1 are all conversions: application of the redundancies creating them is not reflected in the realisation of the name. The derived forms are all also name-based names. They are also, as name-to-name conversions, derivatives that do not add to the system of names, but rather provide names with a greater variety of syntactic possibilities than are available to basic names. I want to consider in what follows
derived names which enlarge the system and may be overtly marked as derivatives. Let us firstly look at the notion ‘system of names’.

The simplest system of nomination is one in which each individual is allotted one of a set of possible simplex names. The practice of nomination among the Anglo-Saxons, also alluded to in §2.2, is a mixed system, with one subsystem approximating to the simple system just described. It is traditional (cf. Clark 1992: 459-61) to differentiate Anglo-Saxon simplex names into two types (apart from one or two which don’t seem to fit either category; names which (as part of the traditional ‘heroic’ vocabulary) potentially correspond to one of the elements that also occur in bipartite (‘dithematic’) names (e.g. Cild, Brid – though the latter does not occur in extant dithematic forms – Colman 1992: 28) and simplex names that are in origin nicknames (e.g. Loc); the former type are referred to as ‘monothematic’, and they seem to represent the core of the simplex system, rather than nickname-based elements. Likewise, bipartite nicknames can be seen as marginal to the two-element formations. There is a large overlap in the set of monothematic names and the set of elements that can occur in dithematic forms. Moreover, there is considerable overlap in the set of elements that occur in first position in a bipartite formation and those that occur in second. There seems to be no principled way to exclude from either position the elements that occur only in the other. As we have seen, choice is partially dictated by the signalling of kinship ties and the desire for differentiation. Thus we have essentially the same system operative in simplex names and at each position in a bipartite one. Let us take this to be characteristic of co-existent monothematic and dithematic subsystems and of systems that are only dithematic. I want to contrast these with what I shall refer to as heterothematic n-partite systems, which are prevalent in much of modern Europe.

The familiar institutionalised given-name plus family-name system is heterothematic: the systems at the two positions (whichever name comes first, this varying in different languages) are distinct and are assigned differently. The given name (English John, Frederick etc.) may be chosen relatively freely or, as quite rigorously in the Greek system, reflect kinship; the family name (Smith, Jones) is typically determined patrilineally. Alternatively, the non-given-name system may be overtly patronymic (as in Icelandic), or we may have three-element names combining patronymic and family name (Russian). Alternative three-element (and greater) systems involve duplication of the given-name system (Mary Anne), and thus are only partially heterothematic, though one such name is usually dominant over the other. Another possibility is duplication of the family name, typically by including, as secondary, the maternal (primary) family name. Of course, in different social circumstances an individual may be addressed or referred to by these whole names or appropriate parts of them (or by some by-name, or title).

All this is familiar, and involves rudimentary internal structure. Patronymics, however, exemplify derived names which, as well as providing a distinct naming system, incorporate a non-name element. Thus the Icelandic name in (118a) contains an element, -dóttir, which otherwise occurs as an independent noun meaning ’daughter’, which is characterised there as seeking to be a modifier in a name created on the basis of another name:

(118)a. \[
\begin{array}{l}
\{N\{\text{def}\}\} \\
\{N\} \\
\{\text{loc}\}\ \\
\{\text{N}\} \\
\{N/P\{N/\text{loc}/\{N\}\}\} \\
\{N\} \\
\{N\} \\
\{N\} \\
\{\text{Hermanns}\} \\
\text{dóttir}
\end{array}
\]
I have included in (118.a) the results of applying (91) to Hermannsdóttir, i.e. the ‘{N}{def}’ component above the ‘{N}’ created by the derivation of the patronymic. The –s (‘genitive’) inflexion on Hermann is a reflexion of the ‘{loc}’ whereby the base name depends on the head of the derivative name. The patronymic element is a noun which modifies a ‘{N}’ on which depends a name which is in a locative relation to it. Presumably over time the salience of the patronymic element in such representations can decline, giving, say, representations such as (118.b), with a patronymic suffix rather than a potentially independent element. And eventually such a derivation may become opaque, as in Present-day English Johnson.

The representation of the suffix in (118.b) differs from that for syntactic modifiers in one crucial respect. Whereas in the syntax the category of the upper node introduced above the basic category by the modifier is identical to that of the basic category, as in (93), repeated here, morphological derivations are not restricted in this way (as is generally recognised, and has indeed been taken by some as criterial):

(93) \[ \{N\{def\}/\{N/\{prt\} \}
\]

In the derivational morphology an affix may introduce a node different in category from the base which it seeks to attach to, as in the representations in (119) – the derivation may be category-changing:

(119)a. \[ \{N\}
\]

(119)b. \[ \{N\}
\]

(119.a) shows a representation of the nickname Fatty based on the adjective fat, with name-forming suffix -y. In (119.b) we have a name, Lucky, converted from an adjective based on a noun. The conversion involved in (119.a) is, of course, category-changing, as with the various lexical redundancies we have encountered in the course of the discussion. I do not formulate here the redundancies underlying the present derivations, in so far as these are straightforward and introduce nothing new in principle; nor, of course are these representations intended to be exhaustive as characterisations of the items concerned (any more than most other representations formulated here). My aim has simply been to illustrate what seem to be the commonest synchronic sources of derived names. I conclude the subsection with a brief consideration of phrasal names.
Another diachronic source of new names is the lexicalisation of phrasal expressions, either by borrowing (similar to calquing), as with the Hague, or by article-retaining conversion, as with the Barbican or the Channel, by more extensive ‘freezing’ of apparently originally freely formed phrases, as with the University of Queensland or the Straits of Magellan. I presume these forms are listed lexically as such, as represented, say, in (120):

(120)a. \[ \{N\} \]
    | \[ \{N{def}\}\]
    \[ \dot{a} \{N\} \]
    \[ \dot{a} \{N\} \]
    \[ \{p.rt\} \]
    \[ \{N;P{cnt}\} \]
    \[ the \ Hague \]

b. \[ \{N\} \]
    | \[ \{N{def}\}\]
    \[ \dot{a} \{N\} \]
    \[ \dot{a} \{N,P\} \]
    \[ \{N;P{cnt}\} \]
    \[ the \ Channel \]

c. \[ \{N\} \]
    | \[ \{N\} \]
    \[ \{N{def}\} \]
    \[ \{N{def}\} \]
    \[ \dot{a} \{N\} \]
    \[ \dot{a} \{N\} \]
    \[ \{p.rt\} \]
    \[ \{N,P{cnt}\} \]
    \[ the \ Straits \ of \ Magellan \]

As with other names, the highest ‘\{N\}’ in each of (121) is susceptible to (91):

(91) \[ \{N{def}\} \]
    | \[ \{N\} \]

Some nouns like that in (120.a) belong to a class, such as that of river names, which are uniformly phrasal in this way, and the ‘\{N\} – \{N{def}\}’ component is presumably introduced by a redundancy based on the categorisation of the basic \{N\} as a river name (analogous to Carroll’s (1985) “ruleschemes”). Or perhaps the Thames etc. are, even in terms of synchronic lexical derivation, reductions of the river Thames etc.

Gary-Prieur (1994: 227-31) illustrates similar differences in behaviour in French between such sporadic town names as Le Havre and subclasses of place name that systematically bear the article, such as regional and country names, like la Bourgogne and la France (and she notes, for instance, the regular lack of the article in hors de France, en France), as well as rivers and mountains. But her semantic interpretation of the function of la here is not very firmly based. She argues that ‘les lieux géographiques se caractérisent par une stabilité dans le temps que n’ont ni les personnes ni les villes’ (1994: 228); and this is what is recognised by the use of the article with country names etc. This seems to imply that speakers of French make overt a semantic distinction between country/region and
city/person names that is apparently not shared by speakers of, say, English and Spanish, or, as rather
differently manifested, by speakers of Greek: or, at least, the distinction is not made overt in these
languages. This follows from the observation that, while all of French, English and Spanish certainly
mark city names only sporadically with an article, only in French (of the three) are country/region
names (as opposed to city, or personal, names) regularly accompanied by the article. (In Spanish,
there are both some country names and some city names that alternate: (el) Perú, (la) Coruña – see
e.g. Alarcos Llorach 1999: 83-4 – and some regions have an obligatory article, as la Mancha – Herrero
Vecino 1997: 93.) In Greek, on the other hand, the article regularly precedes all these name types
(country/region, city, person) when any of them are used as an argument, as we have illustrated in
the preceding. In support of her suggestion, Gary-Prieur invites us to imagine ‘les complications pratiques
et diplomatiques qu’engendrerait’ a situation in which two countries have the same name. But this
doesn’t have to be left to the imagination: history has experienced these complications. Things are,
moreover, further complicated by the observations that in all these languages (not just French) river
names are accompanied by the article, as are (as with other plural names) plural mountains (ranges),
and that (singular) mountain names in French are not all accompanied by the article. And other place
name types get us into further complications still.

(120.b) illustrates ‘{N}s’ that are transparently based on common nouns (so as to have
Sørensen 1958: 168 doubt there namehood – recall §2.1). And (120.c) incorporates a variety of ex-
syntactic elements as part of the name.

We come full circle in this subsection in taking note of such noun-to-name conversions as that
represented, after application of (91), in (121), and discussed above as (9.e):

(121) \{N{def,sg}\}
    | \{N{cnt}\}
    | \{N,P{cnt}\}

\[ Government \]

Here we have a collective name derived from a noun, which again allows singular or plural verbal
concord: Government has/have decided ...

3.3.3 Remarks on name-based derivations Finally here I want to look briefly at the role of names as
bases for the deriving of items of a different category. Let us begin again with instances of
conversion, rather than affix-based derivations.

We have already encountered collective or institutional names based on personal names (Ford
etc.): traditional (name-to-name) eponymy. And both institutional and basic names can form the base
for diachronic conversions to common noun, for eponymy in the extended sense (name-to-noun
eponymy). Two such diachronic developments are the familiar Ford (company) \(\Rightarrow\) Ford (vehicle);
(Earl of) Sandwich \(\Rightarrow\) sandwich. Synchronically, the former derived noun retains a relation with the
name for most speakers: not all motor vehicles are Fords (yet). So in its case (122) is perhaps
appropriate:

(122) \{N,P{cnt}\}
    | \{N{cnt}\}
    | \{N\}

\[ Ford \] (vehicle)

I am assuming, as indicated, that the noun is based on the corporate name: recall (115).

We cannot associate such transparency with sandwich (except in elementary courses on
morphology). So the name component in the (synchronic) representation of the noun in (122) is
presumably absent in its case – its synchronic derivation does not involve eponymy. The synchronic
status of the eponymously derived noun in (47.b) is also perhaps in doubt for some speakers, or in some
usages:
(47) a. Bill drives a Ford  
b. Bill needs a new hoover

We see a like obscuration in the development of many instances of antonomasia: for many users of English *mentor* is no longer name-based, whereas for many a *Solomon* remains transparently so – a common noun derived from a name on the basis of resemblance. Greenough & Kittredge (1962: ch. XXVI) and Vallins (1935: ch.V), for instance, provide many such histories. As Vallins (1935: 64) observes, ‘name-words perhaps even more than other words tend to grow old-fashioned’. Sometimes such name-noun conversions may be signalled overtly in morpho(phonologically) as well as distributionally. Consider, for instance the examples in (123) from Gary-Prieur (1994: 169):

(123)a. Il y a du Duras au programme  
    (‘There is some Duras on the programme’)  
b. Il y a du André au programme  
    (There is some André on the programme’)

Given that *Duras* in (123.a) is the name of a female writer, one would expect a preceding definite article to be *la*, so that *du* rather than *de la* is wrong gender. The gender makes overt the conversion to a noun. Likewise, the name in (123.b) would as a name demand, since it begins with a vowel, the preceding formation *de l’* so, *de l’André*. The presence of the composite article rather than contraction of the article with the following item again reflects the conversion.

But names also participate in affix-marked derivations, affix-marked eponymies (if we extend the traditional term even further), involving affixes generally shared with other nominals (items with preponderant *N*). Some country and regional names form the basis for (often irregular) adjectives in -*ish*, as (124.a), a suffix which also attaches to other nouns (124.b), including nationality nouns (c) which have themselves been converted from (plural) tribal names:

(124)a. Spain ⇒ Spanish, France ⇒ French, Wales ⇒ Welsh  
b. fever ⇒ feverish, monk ⇒ monkish, slut ⇒ sluttish, baby ⇒ baby-ish  
c. Dane ⇒ Danish, Turk ⇒ Turkish

(cf. e.g. Jespersen 1942: §19.62). The process underlying (124.a) is scarcely productive, unlike other derivations involving -*ish*. But more generally available is the corresponding process involving the suffix -(i)an, which attaches to city names as well, as shown in (125.a), though it also shows some irregularities:

(125)a. Italy ⇒ Italian, Macedonia ⇒ Macedonian, Morocco ⇒ Moroccan, Chicago ⇒ Chicagoan,  
    Bristol ⇒ Bristolian  
b. Elizabeth ⇒ Elizabethan, Petrarch ⇒ Petrarchan, George ⇒ Georgian  
c. republic ⇒ republican, suburb ⇒ suburban, mollusc ⇒ molluscan, mammal ⇒ mammalian

(125.b) illustrates the use of the suffix with personal names, and (c) its widespread use with nouns (Jespersen 1942: §21.1,3).

A collective noun can be formed from the results of (124.a) (*the Spanish, the French, the Welsh*); and -*man* can be added to some of them (and to other nationality adjectives) to give a national designation as in (126.a):

(126)a. French ⇒ Frenchman, Welsh ⇒ Welshman, Scots ⇒ Scotsman  
b. China ⇒ Chinaman  
c. gentle ⇒ gentleman, post ⇒ postman

The element is added more rarely to country names (126.b), but it is again available to form nouns from adjectives, as well as from other nouns (c).

With the name-based formations in (124 a/c), (125.a) and (126 a-b), the names of countries or of cities contribute only their country-name or city-name content to the meaning of the derived form: the adjective *Moroccan* means ‘associated with Morocco’ and it is the addition of the suffix which contributes the ‘associated with’ component. So that (127) is in this respect not too underspecified as a representation of the character of the base in *Moroccan*:
Morocco an

In the representation of a Moroccan, there is simply added to the representation of the adjective a human count ‘{N:P}’ above ‘{N:P}’, allowing use of the indefinite article etc.

The contribution of the bases of the forms derived in (125.b) is also limited, but these derivatives begin to build on encyclopedic knowledge: Elizabethan/Georgian is usually applied to something ‘associated with’ the period of Queen Elizabeth of England or with the period of the British Kings named George I-IV; and Petrarchan typically summons up ‘sonnet’ and is used to label the form of the sonnet ‘associated with’ the poet Petrarch. (See Chapman 1939, for a range of examples.) As usually interpreted, these go beyond a simple combination of ‘associated with’ and name. And the apparent contribution of the name to other derived forms can be even more detailed and individual:

Wagnerian, Byronic, Macadamisation, Falstaffian, Stygian, Balkanisation

Such formations might be taken to indicate (in the spirit of e.g. Kuryłowicz 1966 or Linsky 1983) that the ‘meaning’ of names is richer than envisaged by the modified Millian position adopted here: the position that names are limited in sense to a few basic semantic distinctions, the core of which are typically grammaticalised in a range of languages. But whether or not one wants to distinguish what is appealed to in such formations as ‘encyclopedic knowledge’, as I did above, the character of what is understood by the derived form is in each case idiosyncratic and ungeneralisable to an extent that makes them unlike other morphological formations. Certainly derived forms in general can develop idiosyncratically (consider e.g. gentleman from among the items invoked in the preceding); but the forms in (128) are inherently idiosyncratic. This is because Wagner (etc.) doesn’t ‘mean’ anything except that it names a person (or place). The knowledge that we use in interpreting (128) is not part of this ‘meaning’, but, as with the eponymies (sandwich and the like) mentioned initially in this subsection, involves an unsystematic selection of ‘attributes’ of the individual referred to. Compare (128) with the other formations discussed in this subsection, and with my rough description of the content of Moroccan. Morocco is the name of a country; this is what the name contributes to the meaning of Moroccan. Wagner is the name of a person (where we ignore all the other Wagners); that is what it contributes qua name to the meaning of Wagnerian. The rest is an idiosyncratic property of the derived form based on conventional knowledge of the referent of the name.

Such a view is in accord with Gary-Prieur’s account of the differences in interpretation between nouns and names:

‘… alors que l’interprétation d’un nom commun ne met en jeu que la compétence lexicale, celle du nom propre requiert presque toujours une mise en relation avec le référent initial, qui mobilise ce que j’ai appelé des connaissances discursives.’

(1994: 244). And it is quite consistent with Carroll’s conclusion that:

… proper names do abbreviate descriptions – but not in the logical sense that Mill correctly rejected and that Frege mistakenly espoused. Rather, proper names functionally abbreviate descriptions, suggesting rather than asserting or presupposing referent properties …, structurally specifying category information (as the Willis Avenue Bridge purports by its very form to be the name of a bridge), or isolating intended referents by establishing joint attention.

(1985: 180). Phrasal names make overt the categorisations associated with many names.

However, such derivations as those in (128) – indeed the existence of derivations at all, particularly shared with nouns – might also be taken to call into question the grouping of names, as I have done, with (particularly personal and deictic) pronouns rather than common nouns. Formations based on pronouns are notoriously scanty. Notice, however that, on the one hand, name morphology cannot be identified with noun morphology (e.g. Kuryłowicz 1966, Gómez de Silva 1994: 208). On the other, the paucity of pronoun-based formations is scarcely surprising independently of their primary categorisation, given the limited numbers and restricted semantic and encyclopaedic content of pronouns and, particularly, their status as ‘shifters’. Pronouns have no persistent referent; therefore,
derivations such as (128) based on them are unlikely. Names are similarly limited in the semantic distinctions we can associate with them. But they have persistent referents whose persistence enables and encourages derivations like (128). However, we do find formations based on pronouns, involving derivations based on their limited semantic content in the same way as with name-based forms.

Just as the name-based forms in (129.a) discussed in §2.1 exploit the sexual differentiation of names, so the same differentiation in pronouns can be used in the same way (b):

(129)a. billy-goat, tomcat
   b. he-goat, she-wolf

We even find a pronoun combined with one of the elements discussed above (cf. (126) in (130.a):

(130)a. he-man
   b. snowman, freeman

(130) differs from the forms in (126) in showing an unreduced vowel in the second element, but this it shares with forms such as those in (130.b). And it is certainly a derived form. Indeed, it even begins to approximate to the formations in (128) in so far as it is scarcely simply the sexual category of the referent that is being conveyed (redundantly). This is even more obviously the case with the once current formation in (131), again involving one of the affixes discussed above (recall (124)):

(131) ittish

Jespersen (1942: 325) glosses this form as ‘sexually attractive’. This sense is no doubt inherited from the noun, converted from the pronoun (as in She has ‘it’), that is the immediate source of (131), but it is not part of the meaning of the pronoun.

Rather than pursuing other deictic-based derivatives (the here-and-now etc.), my ego can’t resist, of course, bothering the reader, in conclusion, with presentation of the selection of morphophonologically regular Greek derivatives in (132.b) based on the pronoun in (a):

(132)a. ego ‘I’

even though I don’t dare tutoyer. But enough of meitas!

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Note

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