Dynamic Semiotics

Manifesto of Dynamic Semiotics

The word “semiotics” derives form the Greek σημεῖον - sēmeion, "a sign, a mark" and designates the science of signs (variants are: semeiotics, Fr.: sémiologie). The word “dynamics” derives from Greek δύναμις - dynamis "power". Thus “Dynamic Semiotics” considers the forces, which stabilize or change the sign relation, i.e. the relation between sign body and its object; this relation and the laws which govern it are called “interpretant” by Peirce. Such processes can occur on different time and space scales. The time scale reaches from cosmological processes (cosmology and semiotics), to evolutionary semiotics, historical developments and biographical processes (language acquisition, language shift) and finally to the microdynamics of language use in situations and the brain dynamics in language understanding and production. The spatial scale may consider the communication with extraterrestrial intelligent beings, global sign communication, communication inside nations, social groups and individual self-consciousness (via signs).

If we already find some basic ideas on the dynamic nature of language in Locke, Leibniz, Condillac and Humboldt (cf. Wildgen, 1983), the fundaments of dynamic semiotics were laid by Norbert Wiener (first edition of “Cybernetics” 1948) and Piaget (Le structuralisme, 1968) who refers to Ferdinand de Saussure. The idea of a “synchronic system” and its stability would have been inspired by equilibriums considered in the science of economy (ibidem: 17). The decisive impulse came with the work of René Thom (1923-2002) who after 1968 developed a morphodynamic view of the world and of language. The singularities in which sign-structures appear, i.e. the process of semiosis (creation of meaning and signs) lies at the heart of “Dynamic Semiotics” which is a subdomain of “Semiophysics” conceived by Thom after 1988 (cf. Thom, 1988, Petitot, 1992 and Wildgen and Brandt 2010). The applications to semantics were further developed in Wildgen (1982, 1985, 1994) and Brandt (1992, 1994 and 1995). New developments mainly in chaos theory, fractal geometry, dissipative systems and synergetics were integrated into the field of dynamic semiotics in Wildgen and Mottron (1987), Wildgen (1994), Wildgen and Plath (2005), and Petitot (1992, 2011, in press). Computational applications were suggested by Andersen (2002).

The central notion of “sign” contains since the first definitions given in antiquity (e.g. by Augustinus) the relation: A (the sign) stands for B (its object). Further arguments were added: “by whom”, “for whom”, “in what respect”, “in what context”. Since the psychological turn (late nineteenth century) the mental correlates of the sign and its object (Vorstellung, representation) were put into the foreground. There are two dilemmas which endanger the analysis of signs. First, the objects seem to be inaccessible without the use of signs (Kant’s “Ding an sich”) and mental correlates are only accessible via introspection which is not falsifiable (and thus in mainstream philosophy of science unscientific). Second the metalanguage in which the description and explanation of signs has to be formulated is not significantly different/distant in relation to its objects, i.e. the signs and their usage. In contradiction to model theoretic semantics, which proposes more and more meta-languages (models), dynamic semiotics tries to isolate the singularities which create or change the relation “stand for” and separates them from the further evolution of the sign relation governed by a myriad of individual and social forces. The empirical access is therefore local and not global as in logically minded system reconstructions. The question how to understand the global topography and the way of “gluing” local maps (in a global analysis) is only considered in a second step, whose difficulty is dramatically higher given the number of contingencies. Dynamic semiotics therefore reduces the exaggerated optimism of system builders since Descartes in the 17th century (also manifested by Chomsky’s Cartesian attitude in the 20th century).

W. Wildgen